The Sunset of  Quality Control  in Modern Trademark Licensing by Calboli, Irene
American University Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 2 Article 2
2007
The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern
Trademark Licensing
Irene Calboli
irene.calboli@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Calboli , Irene. “The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern Trademark Licensing.” American University Law Review 57,
no.2(December 2007): 341-407.
The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern Trademark Licensing
Abstract
Historically, based on the premise that trademark protection is about consumer welfare, trademark law has
allowed trademark licensing only as long as licensors control the quality of the products bearing the licensed
marks. Ever since its adoption, however, this rule has been difficult to enforce because it hinges on a concept
that is ambiguous and difficult to frame in a legal context: quality control. Unsurprisingly, the consequence
has been inconsistent case law and much uncertainty as to what represents valid licensing. In addition, in the
past decades, courts have proven increasingly reticent to strictly apply this rule and have declared agreements
with minimal or no control valid as long as the public was not misled. The rise of recent practices such as, inter
alia, promotional trademark licensing has contributed to this trend and highlighted the growing
unsustainability of the current requirement in today's economy. This Article argues against this uncertainty
and advocates for an amendment to the current rule that would allow licensing with or without control. In
support of this change, this Article offers evidence that, contrary to the original intention of the law, this rule is
negatively affecting competition in the marketplace and allowing unfair competitors to initiate frivolous legal
actions. This Article therefore proposes that, rather than focusing on an increasingly sterile and confusing
requirement - quality control - the courts should assess the validity of licensing by focusing directly on the
result of the agreements - whether the use of the licensed marks will deceive consumers.
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that it is Monday morning and you are the managing 
editor of your school’s law review.  As every morning, you are seated 
in the STARBUCKS coffee shop in front of your school reading the 
newspaper while sipping your coffee from a STARBUCKS mug.  Once 
you are ready to leave, one of your classmates enters the shop wearing 
a HARLEY-DAVIDSON T-shirt and a YANKEES hat.  You greet her 
and notice that she carries a backpack and a binder with the logo of 
your university.  Now imagine that you are back in your law review 
office to work on the final draft of a new issue of the journal.  Around 
noon, you open a bottle of WESTLAW water and call the campus’ 
PIZZA HUT store with the office’s GE phone to order a grilled 
vegetable pizza.  In the afternoon, you leave the office and write a 
note to the assistant managing editor on the LEXIS-NEXIS board 
with instructions to ship the materials to the publisher.  Finally, 
imagine that some of your friends join you for a relaxing evening 
watching a movie on your new SAMSUNG television.  Since last 
Saturday was your birthday, your friends bring a cake with the logo of 
your favorite football team to celebrate and a new model of RALPH 
LAUREN sunglasses as a gift. 
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These scenarios illustrate some examples of “trademark licensing,”1 
one of the most popular modern business practices, where 
trademark2 owners authorize third parties to produce and distribute 
products under their marks, usually in exchange for royalties.  
Originally, trademark licensing was used for products that were 
identical or directly related to those produced by trademark owners 
to increase market production and save costs, like SAMSUNG 
televisions or GE phones.  In the past decades, however, this practice 
has also been used with respect to unrelated products to establish 
brand image in the market, like WESTLAW water or STARBUCKS 
mugs.  Without exaggeration, licensing today interests most products, 
represents a significant source of revenue for many trademark 
owners,3 and continues to grow in importance due to the changes in 
product manufacturing, the internationalization of trade, and the 
shift toward a service economy. 
                                                          
 1. The Oxford American Desk Dictionary defines the term “license” as a 
“permit or permission to own or use something, do something, or carry on a 
business.”  OXFORD AMERICAN DESK DICTIONARY 344 (1998).  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines a “license” more narrowly as a “revocable permission to commit some act that 
would otherwise be unlawful.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 743 (7th ed. 1999).  In the 
trademark context, licensing affords trademark owners the flexibility to grant an 
exception to what would otherwise be infringing use by the licensee.  See 2 JEROME 
GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 6.01[2] (1998) (“A trademark 
license is a contractual arrangement whereby a trademark owner permits another to 
use his trademark under circumstances where, but for the license, the other would 
be a trademark infringer.”); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:1 (4th ed. 2007) (“[A] ‘license’ of a mark . . . is a limited 
permit to another to use the mark . . . .”).  This Article will use the terms “trademark 
licensing” and “licensing” interchangeably.  So too, “trademark licenses,” “licenses,” 
and “licensing agreements” are used interchangeably. 
 2. A “trademark” is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used . . . 
to identify . . . goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by 
others” by section 45 of the Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 
60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2000 & Supp. V 
2005)).  The Lanham Act defines a “service mark” similarly.  See Lanham Act § 45, 15 
U.S.C. § 1127.  The words “trademark” and “mark” will be used interchangeably in 
this Article.  This Article will also use the words “trademark” and “mark” to refer to 
any word and symbol protected under the Lanham Act. 
 3. See, e.g., RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING:  FORMS 
AND ANALYSIS § 4.08[2] (1999) (explaining the advantages of trademark licensing for 
the licensor, including increased market presence and brand awareness); JOHN W. 
SCHLICHER, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  LEGAL, BUSINESS, AND MARKET 
DYNAMICS 30–38 (1996) (detailing various legal and economic factors that affect the 
profitability of trademark licensing); David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer 
Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
671, 681 (1999) [hereinafter Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine] 
(recognizing that the explosion of American industry in the early 1900s gave rise to 
the advantages of trademark licensing); W. J. Keating, Promotional Trademark 
Licensing:  A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 363 (1985) (noting 
that promotional trademark licensing has developed into a “substantial line of 
commerce”). 
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Considering this preeminent role of licensing, few people would 
doubt the validity of this practice and the right of trademark owners 
to license their marks as they see fit.  Yet the history of trademark 
licensing is a controversial one, at least in the United States.4  
Originally prohibited at common law and under the rule of the 
Trademark Act of 1905 as a violation of the primary function of a 
mark—to indicate the origin of the marked products5—licensing was 
recognized as a legal practice only with the adoption of the 
Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”).6  The Lanham Act 
specifically acknowledges that trademarks can be validly used by 
“related companies.”7  Judicial decisions in previous years paved the 
way for this shift, accepting that trademarks could indicate 
commercial origin not only as actual product sources, but also in 
terms of consumers’ expectations by guaranteeing that all products 
bearing the same mark shared the same quality regardless of the 
manufacturer.8  Yet, as a corollary to this principle, courts also 
required that licensors guarantee a consistent product quality by 
                                                          
 4. For a reconstruction of trademark history, see, for example, FRANK I. 
SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 
(1925); see also Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 
TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975) (providing a historical overview of the marks used to 
identify goods from antiquity through the middle ages); Benjamin G. Paster, 
Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 552 (1969) (arguing that 
increasingly complex trade and commerce necessitated the use of trademarks to 
identify the producer of a product); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter 
Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29, 29 (1910–1911); Gerald Ruston, On the 
Origin of Trademarks, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 127 (1955). 
 5. “Prior to passage of the Lanham Act many courts took the position that the 
licensing of a trademark separately from the business in connection with which it 
had been used worked an abandonment.”  Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, 
Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959); see Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 
U.S. 403, 415 (1916), superseded by statute, Lanham Act § 22, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 
Stat. 427, 435 (1946).  For an overview of the emergence and acceptance of 
trademark licensing, see Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing—Towards a More 
Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 645 (1988); Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a 
Four-Letter Word:  Debunking the Myth of the “Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark 
Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 532 (1992). 
 6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n. 
 7. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055.  See 4A RUDOLF CALLMAN, CALLMAN ON 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 26:24 (Louis Altman ed., 
Thomson/West 4th ed. 2006); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 18:49–50. 
 8. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:55 (explaining that there is no 
requirement that the products be of a specific quality, so long as the quality of the 
products is consistent).  See generally Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance 
Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363, 363–64 (1974) (suggesting that, 
consistent with the traditional function of a mark as indicative of quality, consumers 
rely on the mark as guaranteeing quality of the product across the board).  In 
contrast, Kevin Parks points to the origin of the “guaranty” function of trademarks 
attributed to Frank Schechter and argues that this quality guarantee has been overly 
inflated in subsequent scholarly discussions.  Parks, supra note 5, at 533. 
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setting quality control requirements for licensees.9  Without such 
control, courts considered licenses “naked” and trademark rights 
forfeited based on the assumption that without this control, licensors 
could not guarantee consistent product quality, and this would result 
in consumer deception.10  While establishing this principle, however, 
courts never elaborated on how much control was necessary for 
licensors to satisfy the requirement and adopted a case-by-case 
approach on the issue. 
Following this judicial doctrine, quality control was introduced into 
the Lanham Act as part of the definition of “related companies” and 
has since represented the condition for valid licensing in the United 
States.11  Unfortunately, like the judiciary before its adoption, the 
statute neither provided a definition of “quality” and “control” nor 
indicated how much control must be used for licensing to be valid.  
As a result, courts continued to interpret the requirement case by 
case.12  Not surprisingly, such an approach has often led to 
contradictory decisions and uncertainty as to what constitutes a valid 
license.13 
Generally, however, the decades that followed the enactment of the 
Lanham Act were characterized by a growing judicial preference 
                                                          
 9. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:11 (“[I]t is clear that trademark law permits 
the licensing of a mark under any circumstances where the licensor exercises quality 
control over goods and services . . . .”). 
 10. See Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 366 (“[T]he Lanham Act places an affirmative 
duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark to take reasonable measures to detect 
and prevent misleading uses of his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation of his 
federal registration.”); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:42 (suggesting that the 
trademark owner does not merely have the right to control quality, but rather an 
obligation to do so). 
 11. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 12. See Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); Exxon 
Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, 109 F.3d 1070, 1075–80 (5th Cir. 1997); Stanfield v. 
Osborne Indus., 52 F.3d 867, 871–72 (10th Cir. 1995); Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. 
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977); Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d 
at 367; Halo Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028–31 (N.D. 
Cal. 2003); Westco Group, Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087–91 
(N.D. Ohio 2001); Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., 949 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1997). 
 13. In addition to adopting inconsistent decisions with respect to licensing, 
courts have traditionally adopted inconsistent decisions also with respect to 
trademark assignments.  In a previous article, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”:  
A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2005) [hereinafter Calboli, 
Assignment “With Goodwill”], I advocated for the change of the current rule of 
assignment “with goodwill” and proposed a new standard of assignment “with or 
without goodwill” because of, inter alia, such inconsistency.  See id. at 788.  Due to the 
similarity of some of the problems surrounding the two rules, some of the criticisms 
upon which I base my arguments in this paper are similar to those previously 
expressed in the context of trademark assignment.  All arguments expressed in this 
paper, however, are originally targeted to demonstrate the increasing 
unsustainability of the current standard for the validity of licensing and to support 
my proposal for a new standard allowing licensing “with or without control.” 
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toward licensing, and courts rarely declared licenses invalid and 
trademark rights forfeited.  In particular, courts progressively relaxed 
the interpretation of the control that licensors must exercise over 
their licensees and held that first “adequate,” then “sufficient,” and 
then “minimal” control was sufficient to fulfill the statutory 
requirement.  In some instances, courts also declared that evidence 
of control was unnecessary as long as product quality remained 
consistent and the public was not deceived.  In addition to avoiding 
the problem of assessing whether the existing control was 
“sufficient”—a task difficult per se due to the ambiguity of this 
concept—this approach better adapted to the business world, where 
licensing with no or minimal control had long been a common 
practice.14  As elaborated in this Article, this favorable attitude toward 
licensing has continued until the present and in recent years the 
courts have rarely interpreted quality control narrowly. 
As expected, trademark owners and attorneys have welcomed this 
trend as additional evidence supporting their claim against quality 
control.15  Throughout the years, they often advocated for the 
elimination of quality control, arguing that the requirement does not 
protect consumers and is generally used by competitors as a defense 
against (often valid) claims of infringement.16  Trademark scholars,17 
however, have heavily opposed this judicial shift as “evidence that the 
courts are leaning toward protecting trademarks in gross contrary to 
the general principles of trademark law.”18  Still, whether welcoming 
or opposing this judicial trend, neither party has provided a sufficient 
explanation for it—are the courts abandoning quality control or are 
they just interpreting the requirement “broadly”?19  In addition, 
neither party has evaluated how the ambiguities that still characterize 
                                                          
 14. See Nathan Isaacs, Traffic in Trade–Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1931) 
(noting that this has happened because of the “ignorance” of the law or by “making 
the most of the exceptions” recognized by it). 
 15. See Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 774–75; Parks, supra 
note 5, at 531 (discussing whether there is a need for control in trademark 
licensing); see also Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection”:  Control of Quality and Dilution—Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 65, 82–84 (1990) [hereinafter Bannon, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection”]; Neil J. Wilkof, Same Old Tricks or Something New?  A View of Trade Mark 
Licensing and Quality Control, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 261 (1996), reviewed in 87 
TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1997); Michelle S. Friedman, Note, Naked Trademark Licenses in 
Business Format Franchising:  The Quality Control Requirement and the Role of Local Culture, 
10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 353, 363 (2005). 
 16. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:38. 
 17. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999). 
 18. Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 775. 
 19. See id. at 774–75. 
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the definitions of “quality” and “control” are ultimately affecting the 
application of the requirement in practice.  These ambiguities 
continue to represent the most important obstacle to a consistent 
enforcement of quality control.20 
This Article addresses this void in the trademark debate and 
provides a much needed analysis of licensing, the requirement of 
“quality control” and the changes that have affected its application 
since its implementation into trademark law.21  Part I defines 
licensing and the various types of licensing agreements that are 
currently used in the market.  Part II reconstructs the history of the 
acceptance of this practice and the adoption of quality control as the 
requirement for its validity.  Part III considers the difficulties 
encountered by the judiciary in assessing and defining “control” and 
“quality,” and stresses the consequences of the lack of clear 
definitions.  Part IV highlights the increasing unsustainability of 
quality control in today’s economy and offers evidence that modern 
trademark practices are already shifting toward licensing de facto 
without control. 
Part V advocates for a more flexible approach to assessing the 
validity of licensing, which will eliminate the inconsistencies resulting 
from the erratic application of quality control.  Part V argues that the 
current requirement is failing to serve its purpose and suggests a 
clear change toward licensing “with or without control,” where courts 
should focus directly on the actual product quality.  In particular, the 
Article suggests that trademark licenses should be declared valid as 
long as quality remains the same and the public is not deceived.  In 
addition, considering industrial reality, the Article proposes that 
trademark licenses should be considered valid when product quality 
is changed due to variations in product standards, marketing 
                                                          
 20. See Parks, supra note 5, at 536–39. 
 21. This Article focuses its analysis of licensing on trademark law and, specifically, 
the federal trademark statute and relevant judicial decisions.  This Article does not 
elaborate, however, on other aspects of licensing and, in particular, antitrust issues 
and questions related to vertical restraints with respect to the concept of licensors” 
control over their licensees.  Generally, when a licensor exerts too much control over 
its licensees, it can have anti-competitive effects that result in antitrust violation.  See 
Stephen P. Ladas, Trademark Licensing and the Antitrust Law, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 245, 
257–59 (1973).  “The question . . . is whether . . . restrictions are justified . . . or 
whether they are . . . entered into with intent or effect of unduly restricting or 
preventing competition.”  Id. at 254.  For an overview of antitrust aspects of licensing, 
see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971); Tominaga v. 
Shepherd, 682 F. Supp. 1489 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Ladas, supra; see also Robert E. 
LeBlanc, Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and Franchising, 53 TRADEMARK 
REP. 519 (1963); Comment, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark 
Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1973). 
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strategies, or other reasons, as long as consumers are made aware and 
are not deceived because of these changes. 
I. TRADEMARK LICENSING DEFINED 
As it is commonly known, the core of trademark rights resides in 
the ability of trademark owners to exclude unauthorized parties from 
using similar marks on identical or confusingly similar products.22  A 
corollary of this “right to exclude” is the ability of trademark owners 
to authorize third parties to use their marks on a variety of products 
under specific conditions.23  Usually, this authorization is granted by 
contracts, which are defined as “trademark licensing agreements” or 
“trademark licenses.”24  Generally, these contracts can include a 
variety of clauses or conditions such as exclusiveness, territorial 
scope, advertising, product quality, and the percentage and 
frequency of royalties owed to licensors.25 
As indicated earlier, trademark owners originally used licensing 
agreements to outsource to third parties—licensees—the production, 
in whole or in part, of the goods they used to produce under their 
marks.26  This practice, called “classical” or “traditional” licensing, 
continues to be largely used today.27  This type of licensing happens 
when companies like General Electric or Samsung, traditionally 
manufacturers of home appliances, license their marks to one or 
more producers of the same products who then manufacture and 
                                                          
 22. Since trademark law theoretically does not protect trademarks in gross, the 
general premise for the protection of trademark rights is that trademarks either are 
in use or are intended to be in use.  See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000 & 
Supp. V 2005); see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 23. See Lanham Act §§ 5, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127. 
 24. For the definitions of “trademark licensing agreement” and “trademark 
license,” see supra note 1. 
 25. See, e.g., ADAM L. BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK LAW:  PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT, 
AND LICENSING § 12.02[A] (1999 & Supp. 2006) (providing examples of concepts that 
are important in the creation of good licenses); NEIL J. WILKOF & DANIEL BURKITT, 
TRADE MARK LICENSING 221–42 (2005). 
 26. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for 
Trademark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) [hereinafter Franklyn, Liability for 
Trademark Licensors]; Ira Levy et al., Advanced Trademark Licensing, 858 PLI/PAT 609, 
613–22 (2006); Allison Sell McDade, Trading in Trademarks—Why the Anti-Assignment 
In Gross Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used as Collateral, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 465, 485–86 (1998); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of 
Am., 167 F.2d 484, 487–90 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (setting the early standard for a 
traditional trademark licensing agreement); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. 
Supp. 678, 679–80 (D. Mass. 1953) (discussing the requirements of a traditional 
licensing agreement). 
 27. See GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LICENSING DESK BOOK 3 
(1999) (providing a general overview of the licensing industry); see also GREGORY J. 
BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LICENSING DESK BOOK:  2003 CUMULATIVE 
SUPPLEMENT 3 (2003) [hereinafter BATTERSBY & GRIMES, 2003 SUPPLEMENT]. 
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distribute home appliances under the GE or SAMSUNG marks.  
Historically, this type of licensing has been justified on the basis that 
licensees could manufacture the products more cheaply or effectively 
due to their specialization, infrastructure, and economies of scale.28  
Today, this practice is also largely used internationally since many 
companies outsource much of their manufacturing to foreign 
countries.29 
Shortly after the enactment of the Lanham Act, a second type of 
licensing developed and became known as “collateral” licensing.30  
Unlike traditional licensing, this practice usually interests different 
goods and services even if the products continue to be related, in 
type, kind, or market sector, to those “in connection with which the 
public recognition and demand were first created.”31  Collateral 
licensing happens when companies like General Electric or Samsung, 
which manufacture—directly or under traditional licensing—home 
appliances but not home phones, license their marks to one or more 
phone companies to produce and sell phones under the GE or 
SAMSUNG marks.  Here again, the rationale for collateral licensing 
has generally been saving on manufacturing costs due to economies 
of scale.  In addition, this practice aims at creating and satisfying 
consumer demand in areas that are collaterally related to those of the 
products traditionally manufactured by trademark owners.32 
Finally, the past decades have witnessed an increasing use of a third 
type of licensing, commonly known as “promotional trademark 
licensing” or “trademark merchandising.”33  A subset of collateral 
licensing, trademark merchandising is generally used for products 
                                                          
 28. See generally Ladas, supra note 21, at 252–53 (discussing the economic 
foundations of trademark licensing). 
 29. See Jill Sarnoff Riola, Practical Strategies for Global Licensing, 7 J. PROPRIETARY 
RTS. 11, 12–15 (1995) (examining the legal and business issues that commonly affect 
international licensing); Eva Csiszar Goldman, Comment, International Trademark 
Licensing Agreements:  A Key to Future Technological Development, 16 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
178, 178–80 (1986) (discussing the impact of international licensing on developing 
nations). 
 30. Franklyn, Liability for Trademark Licensors, supra note 26, at 13. 
 31. See Marks, supra note 5, at 646. 
 32. See Ladas, supra note 21, at 252–53. 
 33. “Promotional trademark licensing” is defined as “commercial activity” 
whereby “the consumer is more interested in identification with the trademark 
owner than in the quality of the goods bearing the trademark.”  Keating, supra note 
3, at 363.  “Trade-mark merchandising means merchandise that is extensively 
advertised, and being extensively advertised, must live up to high quality.”  Ely Lilly & 
Co. v. Saunders, 4 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. 1939), overruled by Bulova Watch Co. v. 
Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 1974).  This Article will 
use the terms “promotional trademark licensing,” “promotional licensing,” and 
“trademark merchandising,” interchangeably. 
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that are unrelated to those originally bearing the licensed mark.34  
Examples of trademark merchandising are, inter alia, YANKEES hats, 
WESTLAW water, and binders and backpacks with university logos.35  
Once again, the economic justification of this type of licensing is that 
third parties can produce the items to which the mark is affixed more 
cheaply and efficiently than trademark holders.  Yet, rather than 
indicating products’ commercial origins, the primary function of 
merchandising is to increase the attractive function of the marks 
themselves by providing consumers with a variety of items that, while 
satisfying common needs, function as brand builders and allow the 
public to identify with them.36  As this Article elaborates in Part IV, 
this type of licensing has become increasingly predominant in most 
sectors of the market today as an important source of revenues for 
businesses.37  Hence, the rise of trademark merchandising has deeply 
                                                          
 34. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 32–35 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011–12 
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. 
Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ill. App. 1975); see also Keating, supra 
note 3, at 363; Marks, supra note 5, at 645–48.  But see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, The Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 
478–95 (2005) (opposing both the theoretical and practical underpinnings of 
trademark merchandising); Peter Jaffey, Merchandising and the Law of Trade Marks, 3 
INTELL. PROP. Q. 240, 240–42 (1998) (criticizing the argument that merchandising is 
deceptive without established merchandising rights through the trade mark system); 
Veronica J. Cherniak, Comment, Ornamental Use of Trademarks:  The Judicial 
Development and Economic Implications of an Exclusive Merchandising Right, 69 TUL. L. 
REV. 1311, 1315–16 (1995) (opposing a “merchandising monopoly” for trademark 
owners). 
 35. See Franklyn, Liability for Trademark Licensors, supra note 26, at 14 n.53 (noting 
that “[p]romotional trademark licensing mushroomed in the 1970s, led by ‘such 
famous merchandising forerunners as BUSTER BROWN, RAGGEDY ANN, SHIRLEY 
TEMPLE, BATMAN and ROBIN and MICKEY MOUSE’” (quoting Marks, supra note 
5, at 646)). 
 36. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 34, at 504 (stressing the problems 
that are created in a competitive market when the mark itself is considered to be the 
product); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993) 
(highlighting the “growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products 
but also to enhance or adorn them, even to create new commodities altogether”). 
 37. See generally Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights:  An Analysis of 
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 604 (1984) (stressing how 
consumers are willing to pay a higher price for products carrying their favorite 
logos).  As evidence of the growing importance of brands as sources of revenues, 
Business Week has conducted a yearly ranking of the 100 top brands.  In 2006, Coca 
Cola, Microsoft, and IBM placed, respectively, first, second, and third in the ranking.  
See David Kiley, Best Global Brands, BUS. WK., Aug. 7, 2006, at 54, available at 
http://bwnt.businessweek.com/brand/2006/index.asp. Companies are also 
increasingly aware of the possibility of collecting revenues from strategic marketing 
and increased brand value.  See Intangible Business Brand Valuation:  Licensing, 
http://www.intangiblebusiness.com/Brand-Services/Marketing-Services/Licensing~ 
78.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007) (“Brand licensing generates new revenue streams 
and other commercial benefits for brands, with little direct cost.  It is important, 
however, to manage the system so licensing strengthens brand value.”). 
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affected the traditional interpretation of licensing and fundamentally 
challenged the applicability of quality control.38 
II. HISTORY OF TRADEMARK LICENSING AND “QUALITY CONTROL” 
A practice scarcely used at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
trademark licensing is used today in most sectors of the economy and 
affects all types of products, as the examples above illustrate.  Despite 
its popularity, however, the validity of this practice is still the subject 
of heated debates among scholars, judges, and practitioners almost 
eighty years after its acceptance into trademark law. 
Part II provides a detailed analysis of these debates while 
reconstructing the history of the acceptance of licensing and the 
conditions for its validity.  Traditionally, the validity of this practice 
has been construed upon the requirement that licensors control the 
quality of the marked products to prevent variation in quality to the 
detriment of consumers.  Yet, until present, neither the courts nor 
the statute have provided a definition of “quality control” or any 
guidance as to how to interpret the requirement.  As a result, the 
application of quality control has often proven controversial in 
practice and courts have applied the requirement inconsistently. 
A. The Debate on Licensing and Trademark Protection 
The acceptance of licensing and the conditions for its validity have 
been at the center of the debate on trademark functions and 
trademark protection since the first usage of this practice in the early 
twentieth century.  Generally, trademark owners advocated for no or 
minimal restrictions on their ability to license their marks, arguing 
that licensing could save costs, increase production, and provide 
additional revenues for their businesses.39  Despite these arguments, 
however, trademark law has historically construed the validity of 
licensing based on the traditional rationale for trademark protection, 
i.e., by focusing primarily on protecting consumers and market 
competition.40  In particular, courts and scholars have usually 
                                                          
 38. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 39. Parks, supra note 5, at 558. 
 40. Trademarks have been protected over time because they inform individuals 
about the products to which the marks are affixed, guarantee a predictable quality, 
and reduce consumer costs of collecting information at the time of purchase.  See 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective, 30 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“[T]rademark law . . . can be best explained on the 
hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”); see also Nicholas 
Economides, The Economic Aspects of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525–27 
(1988); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM. ST. 
U. L. REV. 199, 202–09 (1991). 
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advocated against trademark owners’ ability to license their marks as 
“things,”41 arguing that trademarks cannot be protected per se, but 
only as conveyors of information about the products they identify and 
as symbols of business goodwill.42 
Traditionally, these limits have been justified by considering the 
social cost of trademarks, particularly the right of trademark owners 
to exclude third parties from using identical or similar marks to 
identify identical or similar products for a virtually unlimited period 
of time.43  Notably, considering that marks are often common words 
and symbols, protecting trademarks per se could amount to creating 
a monopoly on language, a scarce and precious resource in the 
business world.44  To prevent such unjustified monopoly, trademark 
law has historically protected marks only within the limits of 
protecting consumers against false information and protecting the 
market against unfair competition.45 
As a direct result of this approach, trademark law has commonly 
required that trademark owners control their licensees and the 
quality of their products as sine qua non for the validity of licensing.  
Without such control, it has been argued, product quality could be 
affected and consumers could be confused.  In addition, allowing 
licenses without control would facilitate trademark owners’ trading in 
their marks as “things,” thus limiting the availability of words and 
symbols available as marks for competitors to identify similar 
products.46 
Despite this traditional position, however, the argument that 
trademarks can represent the most valuable assets of a business and, 
accordingly, deserve absolute protection has always been part of the 
                                                          
 41. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 1687–88. 
 42. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 43. Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 777.  For further 
explanation of the basis, rationale, and limits for trademark protection, see generally 
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 24–25. 
 44. See, e.g., GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION 25–27 (1967); 
EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIST COMPETITION 218 (3d ed. 1938); 
A.G. Papandrew, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CAL. L. REV. 503, 505 (1956). 
 45. S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946) introduces the Lanham Act as follows: 
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make 
possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to 
distinguish one from the other.  Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of 
quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which 
excellence creates.  To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the 
public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business 
community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their 
diversion from those who have created them to those who have not. 
Id. at 4. 
 46. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
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debate on the scope of trademark protection.47  Originally, common 
law courts protected trademarks as property and based their 
jurisdiction on protecting trademark owners from the invasion of 
their property.48  Even though this interpretation was abandoned by 
the courts in the first decades of the twentieth century49 and the 
adoption of the Lanham Act in 1946 confirmed trademark protection 
within the limits of public welfare,50 the temptation to protect 
trademarks as property is always present in trademark law, and is 
often evident in trademark practice.51 
In recent decades, this property-based approach to trademark 
protection has been repeatedly revived both by courts and 
                                                          
 47. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813, 818 (1927).  By importing into the United States an idea originally 
developed in Germany in the late 1800s, Schechter developed the doctrine of 
“trademark dilution,” which is based upon the premise that trademarks often 
constitute one of the primary assets of a business.  According to Schechter, “[t]he 
true functions of the trademark are, then, to identify a product as satisfactory and 
thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.”  Id. 
 48. The courts based this protection on natural rights, arguing that trademark 
owners acquired the property of their marks through their possession and control.  
For a detailed reconstruction of judicial decisions and the doctrinal discussion on 
this point, see Edward S. Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of Unfair Trade, 3 ILL. L. 
REV. 551, 552–54 (1909), which provides a detailed list and analysis of the relevant 
case law until the early 1900s.  See also Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition:  A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 314–16 (1978) 
(summarizing the problems faced by the courts of equity in protecting trademarks 
and the recourse to the concept of property).  The Supreme Court  referred to the 
right to use a mark as “a property right” in The Trade-Mark Cases.  100 U.S. 82, 92 
(1879). 
 49. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. Am. Aviation Assocs., 117 F.2d 293, 297 
(D.C. Cir. 1940).  In this pre-Lanham Act decision, the court outlines methods for 
assessing the scope of protection for a trademark that reflect concern for consumer 
interests: 
[T]he law of trade marks is for the market place.  Its purpose is to protect 
the several manufacturers in their respective spheres of public relations and 
to safeguard the consumer by helping him get what he thinks he wants.  The 
method starts, therefore, with placing oneself in the position of a 
purchaser. . . .  [Another method employed by the plaintiff includes 
considering] probable confusion by submitting evidence that purports to 
reveal disorder in the mind of the purchasing public. 
Id. at 294–95. 
 50. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3–6 (1946): 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold.  One is to protect 
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a 
particular trade-mark, which it favorably knows, it will get the product which 
it asks for and wants to get.  Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has 
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is 
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and 
cheats. . . .  [S]ound public policy requires that trade-marks should receive 
nationally the greatest protection that can be given them. 
Id. at 3, 6. 
 51. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990).  According to Judge Easterbrook, “we should treat 
intellectual and physical property identically in the law.”  Id. 
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legislatures.  Courts have often decided trademark cases using 
property theory,52 stating that impairing a mark can support 
trademark protection without likelihood of confusion, particularly in 
the case of famous marks.53  In addition, Congress has frequently 
amended federal trademark law, and all amendments have increased 
the protection of the value of trademarks per se.54  As this Article will 
demonstrate, this trend has influenced the traditional interpretation 
of trademark licensing and, accordingly, has profoundly undermined 
the sustainability of the quality control requirement.55 
B. The Rule of Licensing With “Quality Control” 
Sections 5 and 45 of the Lanham Act set forth the current 
conditions for the validity of trademark licensing.  As indicated 
earlier, licensing was customarily prohibited at common law and 
under the Trademark Act of 1905 based on the assumption that if 
licensed, a mark could no longer serve its function as an indicator of 
origin, and consumers could be confused.56  Most likely as a result of 
the changes in manufacturing and distribution that characterized the 
early twentieth century, the Lanham Act took a different position and 
legitimized this practice by acknowledging that a mark could be 
                                                          
 52. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1988) (affirming 
that trademark protection “like contract law, confers private rights”); San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987) (banning the 
use of “Olympic” for “Gay Olympic Games” and arguing that an “entity 
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word” because of its 
“organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money”); Krebs Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing 
that “[t]rademarks are property” and belong to an estate in the case of bankruptcy); 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (denying First Amendment defense because of the “property right” nature 
of the mark at issue). 
 53. See generally Lemley, supra note 17, at 1697–1700 (arguing that the judiciary 
has increasingly expanded the rationale for trademark protection by considering 
trademarks “as things owned in their own right, rather than as advertising connected 
with a particular product”). 
 54. The most evident example of this trend has been the passing of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.  Pub. L. No. 104-98, §§ 3(a), 4, 109 Stat. 985, 985–
86 (effective Jan. 26, 1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000)).  
This Act directly protects famous marks against tarnishment and blurring, regardless 
of any likelihood of confusion.  This unnatural extension of trademark protection 
has been criticized by many scholars.  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” 
Expansion of Trademark Rights:  Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK 
REP. 525, 552 (1995).  Recently, the Supreme Court also attempted to limit the 
extent of this Act and stated that, for dilution protection to apply, plaintiffs need to 
show actual, not just a likelihood of, dilution.  See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).  In response to this case, the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act was amended in 2006 to reinstate the standard of likelihood of dilution.  Pub. L. 
No. 109-312 §§ 2, 3(e), 120 Stat. 1730, 1733 (effective Oct. 6, 2006). 
 55. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 56. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
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validly used by “related companies.”57  Still, the statute carefully 
crafted the conditions for the validity of licensing according to the 
rationale of trademark law:  protecting consumers and fair 
competition. 
Specifically, section 5 of the Lanham Act states that 
[w]here a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or 
may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure 
to the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration, and 
such use shall not affect the validity of such mark or of its 
registration, provided such mark is not used in such manner as to 
deceive the public.58 
Section 45 clarifies the extent and limit of “such use” and defines a 
“related company” as “any person whose use of a mark is controlled 
by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the 
goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.”59 
According to the statute, the control exercised by trademark 
owners over “the nature and quality” of the licensed products thus 
represents the sine qua non for the validity of trademark licensing.  As 
elaborated below, this requirement was first established at common 
law when the courts consistently affirmed that licenses without 
control were invalid because they could lead to consumer 
deception.60  Neither sections 5 nor 45, however, expand on the 
amount of control that is necessary for the validity of licensing or 
define the meaning of “quality” and “control.”  As criticized in Part 
                                                          
 57. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000). 
 58. Id.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. b (1995) (“If 
the trademark owner exercises reasonable control over the nature and quality of the 
licensee’s goods or services, the benefits of the licensee’s use accrue to the trademark 
owner.”). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).  Originally, a “related company” was defined as “any 
person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for 
registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in 
connection with which the mark is used.”  Lanham Act § 45, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 
Stat. 427, 443 (1946).  This definition was amended in 1988 with the adoption of the 
Trademark Law Revision Act.  Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3947 (1988).  The 
reason for this change was outlined in the following senate report: 
The definition of “related company” is amended to delete the word 
“legitimately” (the word’s presence in Section 5 of the Act avoids any 
inference that use or control can be illegitimate), and to eliminate the 
confusion that exists about whether a related company can control the 
registrant or applicant as to the nature and quality of goods or services. 
S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 44 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5606–67. 
 60. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.  See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:40 
(suggesting that the modern view of trademark law and the permissibility of licensing 
evolved from an emphasis on the source function of trademarks to a focus on 
consumer reliance on trademarks as guarantors of the continuity of product quality). 
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III, this lack of statutory guidance has given rise to much 
inconsistency when assessing the validity of licensing in practice.61 
Following the approach previously adopted by the courts, the 
Lanham Act also provides that lack of quality control can lead to the 
forfeiture of trademark rights if consumers are misled.  According to 
section 14, 
[a] petition to cancel a registration of a mark . . . may . . . be 
filed . . . [a]t any time if the registered mark . . . is being used by, or 
with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the 
source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the 
mark is used.62 
In addition to trademark cancellation, invalid licenses can also lead 
to abandonment of the licensed mark.  As indicated by Section 45, 
“[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of 
omission as well as commission, causes the mark . . . to lose its 
significance as a mark,”63 the mark is abandoned regardless of 
whether the owner intended to abandon the mark.64  Failure to 
control their licenses reasonably can also render trademark owners 
liable for false advertising under the Federal Trade Commission Act65 
when the licensees use the marks as instruments to defraud the 
public.66 
Finally, the Lanham Act permits licensing of intent-to-use (“ITU”) 
trademark applications in addition to marks that are already in use.  
According to the second sentence of Section 5, which was introduced 
into the original text of the provision as a result of the Trademark 
Revision Act of 1988,67 “[i]f first use of a mark . . . is controlled by the 
                                                          
 61. See discussion infra Part III. 
 62. Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  See, e.g., Barcamerica Int’l USA 
Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 597–98 (9th Cir. 2002); Stanfield v. 
Osborne Indus., 52 F.3d 867, 871–72 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 63. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see, e.g., Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 
F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979) (outlining requirement of supervision of trademark 
licensees by licensor to avoid abandonment of trademark); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. 
Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261–62 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (licensing of trademark without 
control results in abandonment); Westco Group, Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 
2d 1082, 1086–91 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (asserting abandonment as a defense to breach 
of license claim). 
 64. See, e.g., Barcamerica Int’l, 289 F.3d at 589 (holding that abandonment of 
trademarks occurring when an owner fails to exercise adequate quality control over a 
licensee is purely an involuntary forfeiture of trademark rights). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–77 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 66. See discussion infra Part V.B.2; see also Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Barton 
Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595, 598  (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 489 
F.2d 809, 813  (7th Cir. 1973) (finding violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)); 3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:48 (citing Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28, 29 
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963) (finding Federal Trade Commission 
Act violation)). 
 67. See Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3938 (1988). 
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registrant or applicant for registration of the mark with respect to the 
nature and quality of the goods or services, such first use shall inure 
to the benefit of the registrant or applicant, as the case may be.”68  
Undoubtedly a sign of the increasing favor toward licensing, this 
provision seems to represent the statutory foundation for 
promotional licensing.69  Once again, however, the language of the 
statute requires that trademark owners control the “nature and 
quality” of the marked products70 even though the statute does not 
specify how much control is necessary for a license to be valid. 
1. The rationale behind “quality control” 
As indicated above, trademark licensing was not accepted as a 
legitimate practice in trademark law until the adoption of the 
Lanham Act, and even then, the practice has been strictly confined 
within the limits of trademark protection.  As I have previously noted 
with respect to other aspects of trademark law, these limits rest on the 
principles that trademarks are protected only as conveyors of 
information about the products which they identify and as symbols of 
commercial goodwill.71 
It was at common law that courts first formulated the principle that 
trademarks are protected primarily because of their function of 
informing the public.  This principle replaced the previous majority 
view—that trademarks were protected as property—and has 
dominated trademark law ever since.72  As a fundamental implication 
                                                          
 68. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000). 
 69. Intent-to-use (“ITU”) applications are most often used for the licensing of 
promotional products, such as HARLEY-DAVIDSON T-shirts, WESTLAW water, or 
YANKEES hats, which are usually not directly related to the goods and services 
manufactured or distributed by the trademark owners.  For a discussion of 
promotional licensing and merchandising, see infra Part IV.A.1. 
 70. According to the Lanham Act, licenses can be declared invalid and ITU 
applications can be cancelled or declared abandoned as per Sections 14 and 45.  See 
Lanham Act §§ 14, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1127.  But see Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1992) (attempting to license a mark is 
evidence of intent to use and safeguards against abandonment), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
1042 (1993). 
 71. See Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 781–84 (elaborating 
on these principles to discuss the rationale of the rule on trademark assignment); see 
also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).  Here, the 
Supreme Court stated that a trademark’s “function is simply to designate the goods 
as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of 
another’s product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection 
with an existing business.”  Id.  For a discussion of the limits of trademark protection, 
see generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,  §§ 23:1–124. 
 72. See generally McClure, supra note 48, at 325–26. “The property justification of 
protection was replaced by arguments in favor of protecting business good will or 
values resulting from use.  Protecting the public from confusion and deception 
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of this principle, courts required that trademarks guarantee the 
“continuity”—in terms of quality and characteristics73—of marked 
products.  On the contrary, trademarks could provide inaccurate 
information to the public, thus losing significance as distinctive 
signs.74  This judicial approach, however, was not absolute as courts 
often clarified that such “continuity” did not necessarily entail the 
sale of identical products.75  Instead, courts generally reasoned that 
“substantial similarity” was sufficient to guarantee such “continuity”76 
and protect the public against deception.77 
Yet, most likely to compensate for this shift away from protecting 
trademarks as property, courts also developed the principle that 
trademarks constituted symbols of commercial “goodwill” and that, 
while trademarks could not enjoy direct protection, their goodwill 
could be protected per se.78  As noted earlier, this principle was based 
upon the consideration that protecting marks as property would 
create a monopoly on language and symbols to the benefit of 
trademark owners but to the detriment of the rest of society.79  In 
                                                          
became a more prominent rationale than protecting property.”  Id. at 329 (footnote 
omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d 
Cir. 1959); Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F. 
Supp. 576, 581–82 (E.D. Wis. 1963), aff’d, 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 74. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2 (“Without the identification function 
performed by trademarks, buyers would have no way of returning to buy products 
that they have used and liked.”); see also Hanak, supra note 8, at 364 (“[A] consumer 
wishes to match a trademark with what he likes and dislikes.  If the origin of a 
product is of concern to a consumer, it is only because the manufacturer’s products 
have come to be associated with a certain level of quality.”). 
 75. This would prove unrealistic, particularly when changes in the features or 
characteristics of a product are required by law or for marketing reasons.  See 
Franklyn, Liability for Trademark Licensors, supra note 26, at 15–16. 
 76. Id.  Franklyn examines what he terms the “diverse quality” problem and the 
attendant challenges of enforcing requirements of quality control when “quality” 
remains variously defined from a standard of high, medium, or low quality or the 
mere requirement of consistent quality.  Id. 
 77. Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 782–83. 
 78. Under the rule of the 1905 Act, Justice Holmes stated, “[a] trade-mark only 
gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will.”  
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:15 
(“Good will of a business and its symbol, a trademark, are inseparable.  Early in the 
development of trademark law, the courts recognized that a trademark is ‘property’ 
only in the sense that it is a symbol of good will . . . .”). 
 79. See Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 4 KY. L. RPTR. 759, 767 (1883). 
The alphabet, English vocabulary and Arabic numerals are to man in 
conveying his thoughts, feelings and the truth, what air, light and water are 
to him in the enjoyment of his physical being.  Neither can be taken from 
him.  They are the common property of mankind, in which all have an equal 
share and character of interest.  From these fountains whosoever will may 
drink, but an exclusive right to do so can not be acquired by any. 
Id.; see also Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 782–83. 
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contrast, protecting solely their goodwill would protect fair 
competition and prevent unscrupulous free riding, without impairing 
societal use of common words and phrases. 
As a result of these principles, particularly the position that 
trademarks had to guarantee consistent product quality, the majority 
of courts took the position that trademarks could not be licensed 
freely but rather only under the control of their owners.80  Such 
control, the courts argued, provided a greater guarantee to the 
public that product quality would be the same, or substantially the 
same.  In contrast, lack of control on the part of trademark owners, 
i.e., naked licenses, could create a breach in product continuity that 
could lead, in turn, to consumer confusion or deception if the public 
continued to purchase the marked products while relying on 
previous quality.81  Hence, to require that trademark owners control 
the “nature and quality” of the licensed products as the standard for 
the validity of licensing seemed to be the only effective way to avoid 
the risk of defrauding the public.82 
Generally, from an economic standpoint, the quality control 
requirement has also been justified based on the assumption that 
changes in product quality resulting from uncontrolled licenses 
could create market failures.83  Even if consumers may sometimes 
benefit from changes in quality, that is, when the quality of the 
products is higher than expected, it has traditionally been affirmed 
that these changes can result in increased consumer search costs, 
thus frustrating the most important function of the mark—to 
decrease consumer search costs by providing accurate information 
about the origin and quality of the marked products.84  Additionally, 
                                                          
 80. E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 167 F.2d 484, 
489 (C.C.P.A. 1948).  “[A] license agreement, not merely a naked license to use, 
where the licensor expressly reserves his right to continue the use of the mark and 
which license agreement provides that the agreement may be terminated by the 
licensor, is not an abandonment of its registered mark.”  Id. at 487. 
 81. See F. Vern Lahart, Control—The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark License, 50 
TRADEMARK REP. 103, 107–09 (1960).  An assurance of continuity of product quality is 
necessary in licensing arrangements to preserve the trademark function of conveying 
information to consumers and preventing confusion.  See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. 
Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1969) (“Inherent in the rules involving the 
assignment of a trademark is the recognition of protection against consumer 
deception.”). 
 82. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 
1959) (“Clearly the only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used 
by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable 
manner the activities of his licensees.”). 
 83. E.g., James M. Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising 
Arrangements, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 453–54 (1968). 
 84. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 166–68 (2003). 
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these changes can thwart consumer expectation about the marked 
products, regardless of their actual quality.85 
Scholars have also pointed out that without the quality control 
requirement, unscrupulous licensors or licensees could change 
product quality and take advantage of unwary consumers.86  Licensors 
could be tempted, for example, to maximize revenues by asking 
licensees to decrease product quality when facing difficulties in the 
market, bankruptcy, or awareness that their marks have no future.87  
Similarly, licensees could decide to change product quality when they 
face financial problems or because of other reasons.  Although 
licensees should also be interested in keeping a consistent product 
quality, lest they risk losing customers, their lack of direct ownership 
of the mark could make them less interested in the long-term success 
of the products.88  Accordingly, they could be more inclined to 
increase short-term profits by decreasing product quality, to the 
detriment of consumers, who could face unexpected drops in 
product quality and likely be deceived when relying on the licensed 
mark for their purchases. 
2. Evolution of the standard 
As mentioned above, trademarks were originally viewed as serving a 
single function:  to identify the origin of the goods to which they were 
affixed in terms of physical “source.”89  Under this interpretation, any 
use of a mark on a product that did not come directly from its owner 
was seen as potentially confusing for consumers.90  Accordingly, 
considering that licensing necessarily implied the outsourcing of 
product manufacturing to third parties, the majority of the courts 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 184–85. 
 86. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 367. “The public is hardly in a position to uncover 
deceptive uses of a trademark before they occur and will be at best slow to detect 
them after they happen.”  Id. 
 87. See Treece, supra note 83, at 453–54 (“A licensee . . . is somewhat more likely 
than a mark owner to vary product quality, giving rise to a requirement that a mark 
owner who chooses to license the use of his mark must eliminate this additional 
increment of risk to the consumer by supervising his licensee.”). 
 88. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 84, at 184–85. 
 89. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 90. See Am. Broad. Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1941), superseded by 
statute, Lanham Act § 5, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 429 (1946), as recognized in 
Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 366–67; Everett O. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers’ Agency, Inc., 
3 F.2d 7, 8–9 (8th Cir. 1924), superseded by statute, Lanham Act § 5; Bulte v. Igleheart 
Bros., 137 F. 492, 501–02 (7th Cir. 1905); Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466, 468 
(Mass. 1946); see also Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest:  Legal 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1638 (“If, by using A’s mark, B confuses 
buyers who mean to buy from A and rely on the mark to denote A’s goods, A is 
injured and can claim protection against the diversion of trade caused by B’s 
appropriation.”). 
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initially saw this practice as “philosophically impossible”91 and thus 
prohibited it.92 
This position officially continued until the adoption of the Lanham 
Act in 1946.  Yet a few courts decided to accept a broader 
interpretation of the “source theory” and started to indirectly allow 
licensing prior to the enactment of the statute.93  The Supreme Court 
itself paved the way for this gradual acceptance of licensing when, in 
1879, in Kidd v. Johnson,94 the Court ruled that the owner of a 
trademark, who entered into a partnership and used a trademark for 
the benefit of the partnership, did not need to transfer ownership of 
the mark to the partnership.95  Although indirectly, the result of this 
transaction was essentially a license and the Court allowed it to 
stand.96  A few decades later, in the 1916 decision Hanover Star Milling 
Co. v. Metcalf,97 the Court went further and held that a trademark was 
not abandoned and could continue to serve its function as a mark 
although it had been licensed.98  Building upon these decisions, 
several lower courts thus started to permit limited forms of licensing 
in different factual situations.99 
By the end of the 1920s, this trend was irreversible.  Licensing had 
become an important part of the economy due to growing demand in 
the market and surge in production, and courts were increasingly 
                                                          
 91. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:39; see also Comment, supra note 21, at 
1174. 
 92. E.g., MacMahan Pharm. Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 471–72 
(8th Cir. 1901).  “A trademark cannot be . . . licensed, except as incidental to a 
transfer of the business or property in connection with which it has been used.”  Id. 
at 474–75. 
 93. See Hicks v. Anchor Packing Co., 16 F.2d 723, 725 (3d Cir. 1926) (noting that 
in Section 7(c) of the 1918 Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-233, 40 Stat. 
1020 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 7(c) (2000)), Congress authorized 
seizure of enemy trademarks and their license to U.S. companies; the grant of such a 
license did not create ownership of the mark in the licensee); Keebler Weyl Baking 
Co. v. J. S. Ivins’ Son, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1934) (describing a 
subsidiary licensing other subsidiaries of United Biscuit Co.); Nelson v. J. H. Winchell 
& Co., 89 N.E. 180, 183–84 (Mass. 1909) (upholding the concept of a licensed right 
to use as distinct from the right to use flowing from ownership); 3 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 1, § 18:39 (citing Martha Washington Creamery Buttered Flour Co. v. Martien, 
44 F. 473, 474–75 (E.D. Pa. 1890) (finding that when a trademark license is 
terminated, continued use by the former licensee is an infringement of the rights of 
the owner of the mark)). 
 94. 100 U.S. 617 (1879). 
 95. Id. at 619. 
 96. Id. at 620. 
 97. 240 U.S. 403 (1916), superseded by statute, Lanham Act § 22, Pub. L. No. 79-
489, 60 Stat. 427, 435 (1946). 
 98. See id. at 418–19 (setting forth that “trademark rights, like others that rest in 
user, may be lost by abandonment”). 
 99. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:39. 
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inclined to uphold this practice.100  As a result, courts and scholars 
started to search for a legitimate way to justify licensing under 
trademark law theory while still focusing on protecting consumers.101  
The solution to this quest was provided by a new interpretation of 
trademark protection that brought about the acceptance of a second 
trademark function in addition to that of indication of source:  the 
so-called “quality assurance” theory.102 
The seeds of this new trademark function had already been put 
into place by the Supreme Court in 1883 in Manhattan Medical Co. v. 
Wood,103 when Justice Field wrote that a mark “is both a sign of the 
quality of the article and an assurance to the public that it is the 
genuine product of his [the owner’s] manufacture.”104  Starting in the 
1920s, courts and scholars elaborated on this principle and argued 
that in modern society trademarks not only signified commercial 
source but also represented symbols of product quality.105  In other 
words, trademarks were symbols of “uniformity or quality in the 
products to which they [were] attached,”106 on which consumers 
relied to guarantee that all products with the same mark shared the 
same quality.  To reconcile this “quality assurance” function with the 
traditional “source theory,” courts and scholars expanded the 
interpretation of the latter and argued that, rather than necessarily 
indicating “actual” product source, trademarks represented product 
source “at large,” that is, the source “controlling” the products 
regardless of the actual manufacturer.107 
Under this new theory, licensing could thus be accepted since the 
licensed marks continued to identify the “controlling source” of the 
products.  As a necessary corollary of this theory, however, the 
judiciary started to require that trademark owners control their 
                                                          
 100. Parks, supra note 5, at 533. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:10 (recognizing a new concept that “a 
trademark did not necessarily have to indicate only manufacturer or merchant 
source, but could also serve to indicate a level of consistent quality”); see also Isaacs, 
supra note 14, at 1215–16; Treece, supra note 83, at 445. 
 103. 108 U.S. 218 (1883). 
 104. Id. at 222–23. 
 105. Much of the credit for developing the trademark “quality assurance” theory 
goes to Frank Schechter, who identified the primary function of a mark as a 
“guaranty that the goods purchased under the trade-mark will have the same 
meritorious qualities as those previously noted.”  SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 150. 
 106. Hanak, supra note 8, at 363. 
 107. In the early 1930s, trademarks were seen as fulfilling two different but 
interrelated functions—indicating the source of the products in terms of “single 
controlling source” and guaranteeing to the public that all products bearing the 
same mark shared the same quality.  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:40. 
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licensees to guarantee consistent product quality.108  If, by contrast, 
trademark owners failed to exercise such control, courts adopted the 
position that the license was invalid because the mark could not 
guarantee against changes in product quality,109 and this, in turn, 
could lead to consumer confusion.110  Yet, while they stressed the 
importance of control, courts never elaborated on how much control 
was adequate for licensing to be valid.  Instead, arguing that it was 
not possible to define control in the abstract,111 they left to individual 
judges the task of deciphering control case by case.112 
The judiciary continued to follow the same line of reasoning after 
the adoption of the Lanham Act.113  Once again, the courts stressed 
that “the only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is 
used by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of 
policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”114  
Otherwise, the concern was that “the public [would] be deprived of 
its most effective protection against misleading uses of a 
                                                          
 108. See, e.g., Comment, Trademark Licensing:  The Problem of Adequate Control, 17 
DUKE L.J. 875, 882 (1968); see also Mascaro v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 243 A.2d 1, 9 
(Md. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 981 (1968).  In a series of cases preceding the 
Lanham Act, courts set forth the principle that licensing of a trademark apart from 
the business to which it had been attached would result in an abandonment.  See Am. 
Broad. Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1941) (“A trade-mark is intended 
to identify the goods of the owner and to safeguard his good will.  The designation if 
employed by a person other than one whose business it serves to identify would be 
misleading.”), superseded by statute, Lanham Act § 5, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 
429 (1946), as recognized in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 
366–67 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 109. E.g., Atlas Beverage Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 113 F.2d 672, 677–78 
(8th Cir. 1940); Dietz v. Horton Mfg. Co., 170 F. 865, 870–71 (6th Cir. 1909). 
 110. See, e.g., Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1905) (“[A] trade-
mark or trade-name . . . gives assurance to a purchaser that the article upon which is 
stamped the trade-mark or trade-name is the genuine production of the 
manufacturer to whom the trade-name or trade-mark points by association as the 
maker of the article.”). 
 111. Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570, 
575–79 (1992) [hereinafter Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution]. 
 112. E.g., Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596–97 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 113. Lanham Act §§ 5, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (2000); see, e.g., Thomas Pride 
Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 208 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (“The 
primary functions of a trademark are to indicate a single source of origin of the 
articles to which it refers and to offer assurance to ultimate consumers that articles so 
labeled will conform to quality standards established and, when licensed to others, 
controlled by the trademark proprietor.”). 
 114. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 367; see Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified 
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If a trademark owner allows 
licensees to depart from its quality standards, the public will be misled, and the 
trademark will cease to have utility as an informational device.”); see also Haymaker 
Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“The purpose of such a 
requirement is to protect the public from being misled.”). 
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trademark,”115 and “the risk that [it] [would] be unwittingly deceived 
[would] be increased.”116  Even after the enactment of the Lanham 
Act, however, courts did not elaborate on how to interpret “control” 
or how much control had to be exercised by trademark owners.  
Instead, this task was left, again, with individual judges as a fact-
intense issue.  Not surprisingly, the result has been judicial 
inconsistency. 
III. PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF “QUALITY CONTROL” 
Central to the interpretation of the quality control requirement are 
the definitions of “control” and “quality,” and in particular what 
represents “adequate control” and “consistent quality.”  As 
highlighted above, traditionally it has proven difficult to provide clear 
definitions of these terms in the abstract.  This in turn has brought 
the judiciary to define control and quality on a case-by-case basis.  Not 
surprisingly, such an approach has led to uncertainty as to how to 
interpret the requirement and ultimately to judicial inconsistencies. 
Part III explores these inconsistencies, focusing on the difficulty 
encountered by the courts in defining quality control.  Because of 
this difficulty, courts have adopted an increasingly open-ended 
interpretation of “control” and often focused more on product 
quality—i.e., whether product quality remained the same—than on 
the control exercised by trademark owners.  Still, this approach has 
profoundly eroded the practical impact of quality control while still 
leaving many doubts as to what constitutes valid licensing. 
A. Judicial Inconsistency in Defining “Quality Control” 
With the exception of minor linguistic clarifications, Sections 5 and 
45 of the Lanham Act have remained formally unchanged since the 
enactment of the statute.117  The interpretation of quality control, 
however, has changed considerably in the past century, primarily due 
to the growing role of licensing in the economy and the rise of 
different types of licensing, such as merchandising.118  The changes in 
interpreting the requirement have directly followed the variations in 
the judicial interpretation of the concepts of “control of related 
companies” and “product quality.”  Still, these concepts are per se 
                                                          
 115. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d. at 367. 
 116. See id. (explaining that “this is precisely what the Act is in part designed to 
prevent”). 
 117. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the change in definition 
of the term “related company” in the Lanham Act). 
 118. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
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ambiguous and, as indicated above, neither the courts nor the statute 
provide any guidance for their interpretation.119  As a result, courts 
have historically defined them in a variety of ways, often reaching 
contradictory interpretations.120 
In particular, prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act, courts 
affirmed that licensing was valid as long as “such agreements [were] 
not merely naked license agreements”121 and the mark remained 
“associated with the same product or business with which it ha[d] 
become associated in the public mind.”122  Thus, the critical inquiry 
for the validity of licensing under this premise was whether licensors 
maintained control over product quality and, specifically, whether 
licensees’ products “conform[ed] to any fixed standard.”123  Courts 
also held that once trademark owners had used and established a 
mark “as a guaranty of the quality of [their] merchandise,” they could 
not validly license it “to those who may sell an inferior product.”124  
Licensors were held responsible for strictly enforcing quality control, 
and courts consistently found licenses without control invalid and 
trademark rights forfeited.125 
Courts continued to require trademark owners’ control after the 
enactment of the Lanham Act.  Almost invariably, judicial decisions 
in the 1940s and early 1950s included the customary language that 
licenses without control were void.126  Yet, during the same years, 
several courts started to show an increasing willingness to uphold 
licensing by adopting a broader interpretation of quality control.  
Specifically, courts stated that “strict” control was not necessary and 
                                                          
 119. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 120. See Comment, supra note 108, at 894 (“[A]n examination of case law since the 
Lanham Act reveals judicial approval of a wide spectrum of licensing agreements, 
ranging from those involving detailed control provisions to those in which licensee 
inspection is made at the licensee’s option.”). 
 121. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 167 F.2d 484, 
489 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (citing Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 524 (1888)).  See 
generally Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); Saalfield Pub. Co. 
v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 238 F. 1 (6th Cir. 1917); Mathy v. Republic Metalware Co., 35 
App. D.C. 151 (D.C. Cir. 1910); Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 F. 821 (8th Cir. 
1901). 
 122. E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 519 (6th Cir. 
1943). 
 123. Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Mass. 1946) (stating that the license 
at issue was not valid because it was not subject to any requirement that the licensee’s 
products conform to fixed standards). 
 124. Id. 
 125. E.g., id. at 468–69; Detroit Creamery Co. v. Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co., 153 
N.W. 664, 666 (Mich. 1915). 
 126. See Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 252 F.2d 945, 952–53 (2d Cir. 
1958); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 679 (D. Mass. 1953) (“[T]he 
trade-mark license is valid if ‘control’ by the licensor over the licensee exists.”). 
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started to assess the validity of licensing based on “whether the 
plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees’ operations.”127  
They thus required licensors to exercise only “adequate” control.128  
Still, because of the case-by-case approach adopted in evaluating 
agreements, the definition of what constituted “adequate” control 
varied considerably, making it particularly challenging to predict 
whether an agreement would be declared valid.129 
In addition to this uncertainty as to the required amount of 
control, the decades following the adoption of the Lanham Act also 
revealed conflicting decisions regarding the formality of including 
quality control in licensing agreements.  Under the traditional 
approach, quality control provisions had to be part of the language of 
the agreement for licensing to be valid.  Yet, while many courts 
continued to require this language to uphold the licenses at issue,130 
others decided to use a more flexible approach in this respect.  In 
particular, starting in the 1960s, a significant part of the judiciary 
adopted the position that “actual” rather than contractual control was 
sufficient to establish the validity of the licenses under their 
scrutiny.131  Courts could not agree, however, on a definition of 
“actual” control and again defined it case by case, thus adding more 
uncertainty to this area of the law.132 
Still, most likely because of the increasing role of licensing in the 
economy, the majority of the courts continued to show a friendly 
attitude toward this practice in subsequent decades and only rarely 
did the judiciary interpret quality control conservatively.133  Most 
courts showed their “willingness . . . to leave no stone unturned in 
finding evidence of sufficient quality control”134 and declared 
                                                          
 127. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 128. E.g., id. at 369; Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 
F. Supp. 715, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 
377, 378–79 (E.D. Pa. 1959). 
 129. E.g., Parks, supra note 5, at 557–61. 
 130. See, e.g., Societe Comptoir De L’Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac 
v. Alexander’s Dep’t. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1962); Arthur Murray, 110 
F. Supp. at 679–80 (finding the licensing agreement valid because it contained a 
provision to control defendant’s methods of operation). 
 131. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 132. See Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that actual control is sufficient to prove adequate 
regulation of a license and that contractual control is unnecessary); see also Bishops 
Bay Founders Group, Inc. v. Bishops Bay Apts., 301 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (W.D. Wis. 
2003) (“[A]n oral license may be sufficient if actual control is exercised by the 
licensor.” (quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:59)). 
 133. For an example of a conservative interpretation by the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board, see Heaton Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. v. Lang.  7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1842, 1847 (T.T.A.B. 1988). 
 134. Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, supra note 111, at 579. 
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licensing valid as long as trademark owners exercised some control 
over their licensees.135  Considering that findings of insufficient 
control could lead to forfeiture of the mark by involuntary 
abandonment, courts consistently affirmed that claimants of naked 
licenses “face[d] a stringent standard [of proof].”136  In addition, in 
some instances courts seemed willing to declare licensing valid, either 
without focusing on licensor control or in the absence of control, as 
long as product quality remained consistent.137 
For the most part, this favorable judicial approach toward licensing 
has continued in recent years, and only occasionally has the lack of 
adequate control brought the judiciary to declare licenses void.138  
Generally, courts have continued to recite that lack of control will 
lead to naked licensing, yet they have found most licenses valid139 and 
accepted almost any evidence of control to uphold licensing.140  
Courts have also repeated that minimal control can satisfy the quality 
control requirement and that evidence of actual control is sufficient 
to prove a license valid regardless of the contractual language.141  
Lastly, some courts have continued to uphold licensing “regardless of 
control” as long as quality remains the same and the public is not 
deceived.142  Yet because of courts’ case-by-case approach and the 
possibility that the agreement at issue will be assessed conservatively, 
trademark owners, licensees, and the market are left with many 
doubts as to what constitutes valid licensing. 
                                                          
 135. E.g., Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 
387–88 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 136. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 
1991) (citing Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir. 
1963)), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 137. See id.; see also Hurricane Fence Co. v. A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 
975, 987–89 (S.D. Ala. 1979). 
 138. E.g., Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2005); Barcamerica Int’l 
USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 595–98 (9th Cir. 2002); Halo Mgmt., 
L.L.C. v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029–31 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Stanfield v. 
Osborne Indus., 839 F. Supp. 1499, 1504–07 (D. Kan. 1993), aff’d, 52 F.3d 867 (10th 
Cir. 1995).  But see Westco Group, Inc. v. K. B. & Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090–
91 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 139. See generally D. Peter Harvey, IP Maintenance:  Protecting Intellectual Property 
Assets Through Registration, Proper Use and Contractual Provisions, 709 PLI/PAT 33, 56–57 
(2002) (noting that, because abandonment constitutes forfeiture of trademark, 
courts hesitate to make such a finding). 
 140. E.g., Karen Marie Kitterman, Quality Control in Trademark Licensing, 821 
PLI/PAT 509, 515 (2005). 
 141. E.g., Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1326–27 (7th Cir. 1979); 
Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477, 482–85 (8th Cir. 1967); 
Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
aff’d, 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 142. See, e.g., Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“It is not necessary, however, for the licenses themselves to contain 
a written provision for control; actual control by the licensor is sufficient.”). 
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1. The dilemma of “adequate” control 
Soon after the adoption of the Lanham Act in 1946, courts started 
drifting away from the position that, for licensing to be valid, 
trademark owners had to enforce strict quality control.143  Instead, 
several courts adopted a broader interpretation and upheld licensing 
agreements as long as trademark owners could prove that the control 
they exercised was “adequate” to guarantee such quality.144  Courts 
never elaborated, however, a specific test to assess whether the 
control used by licensors was in fact “adequate.”  Rather, they 
adopted a case-by-case analysis and assessed control based on how 
licensors guaranteed product quality145 and whether the agreements 
included quality control provisions.  Hence, since decisions were 
based upon the facts of individual cases, courts often reached 
different positions on what constituted “adequate” control.146 
Still, despite these differences, the majority of the courts adopted 
an increasingly favorable approach toward licensing starting in the 
1950s.147  Notably, they declared most agreements valid and invariably 
affirmed that claimants of naked licensing faced a stringent burden 
of proof.148  In their attempt to uphold most licenses, courts also 
continued to relax the interpretation of quality control, and 
specifically what constituted “adequate” control.  Accordingly, several 
courts affirmed that “adequate” could be interpreted as 
“reasonable”149 and that findings of “reasonable” control could 
                                                          
 143. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 144. E.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff’d, 332 
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964); Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796, 805 
(N.D. Cal. 1949). 
 145. Traditional methods of controlling quality have included approval 
requirements, regular testing procedures, requirements to buy certain supplies from 
certain sources, and sending samples.  See Arner v. Sharper Image Corp., 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1282, 1286–89 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that licensing 
agreements contained provisions that showed a reasonable inference of quality 
control even though such control provisions were not explicitly spelled out); 
Embedded Moments, 648 F. Supp. at 194–95 (holding that quality control was sufficient 
when samples were sent to the licensor and the licensee consulted with the licensor 
about manufacture); see also Karin Segall, Trademark Licensing:  The Quality Control 
Requirement; International Trademark Licensing Provision; Click Licenses, 775 PLI/PAT 
353, 357–58 (2004) (explaining that the amount of control required, such as 
policing, approval, or inspection depends on the type of good and potential 
variability in quality). 
 146. Segall, supra note 145, at 357–58. 
 147. E.g., Susser, 206 F. Supp. at 641; Morse-Starrett, 86 F. Supp. at 805. 
 148. Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 823–25 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); U.S. Jaycees v. Phila. 
Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 149. See generally Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48–49 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(finding that as long as the licensor exercises reasonable control over the product’s 
quality, as opposed to maintaining control over specific component articles used in 
operation and production, a license can be valid). 
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dismiss claims of naked licensing.150  Here again, definitions of 
“reasonable” control varied case by case, but courts usually found that 
trademark owners had used “reasonable” control.  Then, part of the 
judiciary lowered this threshold even further and interpreted 
“adequate” as merely “sufficient.”151  Again, what constituted 
“sufficient” control was decided case by case, yet courts accepted 
almost any evidence and even declared that a close working 
relationship between licensors and licensees could prove “sufficient” 
control152 or that such control could be exercised by third parties,153 
including licensees.154 
As part of this favorable trend, the judiciary also developed the 
position that “actual” rather than contractual control could support 
valid licensing.155  This tendency to look outside the contractual 
provisions to find indicia of control was first affirmed in 1959 in Dawn 
Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.,156 where the court held that the 
language of the contract was not directly relevant to the validity of the 
license as long as the licensor exercised actual control.157  However, 
the court clarified that in the absence of actual control, 
abandonment could still be found even if the agreement contained 
quality control provisions.158  Since then, this principle has commonly 
been affirmed by the judiciary and, building upon it, some courts 
have declared that, if actual control is present, an oral agreement can 
also constitute valid licensing.159 
                                                          
 150. TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 885–86 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 151. E.g., Susser, 206 F. Supp. at 641. 
 152. See Segall, supra note 145, at 360 (affirming that another instance in which 
sufficient control may be achieved is a phase-out agreement that provides for quality 
control).  For an example where the court stated that phase-out agreements were not 
per se abandonment, see Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1080 (5th 
Cir. 1997). 
 153. See, e.g., Westco Group, Inc. v. K. B. & Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1091 
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (finding that the licensor exerted enough control over the 
licensee by monitoring operations through industry sources and sales 
representatives). 
 154. See, e.g., Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45, 56 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding that the agreement at issue was valid based on the 
relationship between the licensor and licensee and the fact that the licensee 
complied with FDA regulations), aff’d, 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 155. E.g., Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986); Nat’l Lampoon, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 737 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 156. 267 F.2d 358, 368 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 157. Id.  But see Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852, 
864 (W.D. Ark. 1967) (holding that “it is the right to control rather than the actual 
exercise of control which determines whether or not a license is valid”). 
 158. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 368. 
 159. Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
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Courts continued to lower the bar for what constituted “adequate” 
control in the following decades.  In particular, the judiciary stated 
that “adequate” control was a very low standard and that even 
“minimal” control was sufficient for a license to be valid.160  This 
approach was first elaborated in 1972 in Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. 
Diversified Packaging Corp.,161 where the court found that the fact that 
KFC failed to promptly discover that its licensees had purchased food 
containers from unapproved sellers did not indicate lack of control 
per se, since this requirement was included in the licensing 
agreement.162  Following this decision, several courts continued to use 
findings of “minimal” control to uphold licensing agreements.163  
They also affirmed the decision in Dawn Donut and repeated that 
evidence of “actual” control was sufficient for valid licensing 
regardless of the language of the actual agreement.164 
As highlighted earlier, this favorable attitude toward licensing has 
continued until today.  Present any sign of control, courts have 
generally proven reluctant to declare licenses invalid,165 and only 
occasionally have claims of inadequate control resulted in findings of 
naked licensing.166  Moreover, a minority of the courts have also 
disagreed with Dawn Donut in recent years and stated that contractual 
language providing for quality control constitutes sufficient evidence 
of control even in the absence of actual control.167  This position was 
                                                          
 160. Bureau Nat’l Interprofessionnel Du Cognac v. Int’l Better Drinks Corp., 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610, 1617–18 (T.T.A.B. 1988); Penta Hotels Ltd. v. Penta Tours, 
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1108–09 (D. Conn. 1988); Nestle Co. v. Nash-Finch Co., 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085, 1089 (T.T.A.B. 1987); Embedded Moments, 648 F. Supp. 187 at 
194. 
 161. 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Retention of a trademark requires only 
minimal quality control, for in this context we do not sit to assess the quality of 
products sold on the open market.”). 
 162. Id. at 386–88. 
 163. See, e.g., Hurricane Fence Co. v. A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 
989 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (“The plaintiffs have numerous licensed dealers throughout the 
country and to impose upon the mark owner the duty of monitoring every sale of 
every dealer to regulate its use of the mark would be unconscionable. . . .  The 
fencing business is unique and only minimal quality controls ought to be required.”). 
 164. E.g., Nat’l Lampoon, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974), aff’d per curiam, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 165. Lemley, supra note 17, at 1710–11.  According to the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition, the ultimate test should be “whether the control exercised by the 
licensor is sufficient under the circumstances to satisfy the public’s expectation of 
quality assurance arising from the presence of the trademark on the licensee’s goods 
or services.”  § 33 cmt. c (1995). 
 166. See Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2005); Barcamerica Int’l 
USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2002); Halo Mgmt., 
L.L.C. v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028–31 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 167. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:56 (citing Pike v. Ruby Foo’s Den, Inc., 
232 F.2d 683, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1956)); see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Cameo Exclusive 
Prods., Inc., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 596, 598 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (finding proper “control” 
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highlighted most recently in 2003 in Glow Industries, Inc. v. Lopez,168 
where the court declared that “[t]he language of the agreement 
demonstrate[d] that [defendant] maintained control over the quality 
of the . . . products . . . and the burden thus shift[ed] to [plaintiff] to 
demonstrate that [defendant] did not exercise that control.”169  This 
approach represents a clear step toward licensing de facto without 
control and as such has been criticized by supporters of quality 
control.170  Still, not all courts have subscribed to this trend, and 
inadequate quality control, or lack thereof, continues to be a “risky 
business” for trademark owners.171 
2. Shifting focus on product quality? 
Because of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of “control” 
and, in particular, of what represents “adequate” control, the past 
decades have also witnessed a shift in focus directly onto product 
quality, rather than on control, to assess the validity of trademark 
licensing.  Rather than focusing on the control that licensors had 
supposedly exercised over their licensees, several courts started to 
look at whether the quality of the products was consistent—that is, 
whether all products bearing the same mark in fact shared the same 
quality so the public would not be deceived.  If so, courts assumed that 
licensors had exercised “sufficient” quality control. 
This approach was first established in 1964 in Land O’Lakes 
Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co.172  In this case, the 
petitioner claimed that the defendant engaged in naked licensing 
and accordingly that its mark ought to be cancelled.173  However, the 
court held that even if Oconomowoc Canning had not exercised 
affirmative control on its licensee, the agreement was still valid 
because the company had justifiably relied on its licensee to control 
quality since the licensee had maintained consistent product quality 
                                                          
where licensor had a “right” to control, even though there was no evidence of actual 
control); Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852, 864 
(W.D. Ark. 1967); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Mass. 
1953); Wolfies Rest., Inc. v. Lincoln Rest. Corp., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310, 310–11 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964)). 
 168. 273 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 169. Id. at 1111. 
 170. Such an approach has been criticized as a breach in rationale of the quality 
control requirement.  Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, supra note 111, at 579. 
 171. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:10 (discussing the rule against trademark 
assignment in gross). 
 172. 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 173. Id. at 668. 
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for more than forty years of their licensing relationship.174  Still, from 
a theoretical standpoint, the court continued to affirm that licensors 
have an affirmative duty to police their licensees, but that this was not 
necessary in the case at issue because of the circumstances.175 
In subsequent years, several courts followed this decision and held 
that evidence of control was not strictly necessary to uphold 
trademark licenses as long as product quality was consistent.176  Two 
circuit court decisions from 1985 proved particularly interesting in 
this respect:  Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp.177 and Taco 
Cabana International, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc.178  In Transgo, the court 
upheld the license at issue because the licensor and licensee worked 
closely together for ten years, and even though the licensor did not 
inspect the final products, quality was deemed to have been 
adequately controlled by the licensee.179  Similarly, in Taco Cabana the 
court upheld the agreement at issue based on the close working 
relationship between the licensors and licensees.180  In this case, two 
brothers jointly operated a restaurant.  When one later opened a 
similar restaurant under a licensing agreement, the court found the 
license valid, despite the lack of a quality control provision, on the 
assumption that, after working together for eight years, the brothers 
could reasonably rely on each other to maintain consistent product 
quality.181 
Still, like the court in Land O’Lakes,182 the courts in Transgo183 and 
Taco Cabana184 did not dismiss the theoretical need for control as a 
condition for valid licensing.  Instead, they focused on product 
quality and whether the public was deceived to assess and eventually 
uphold the agreements at issue.  In particular, in Taco Cabana, the 
court stated that “[t]he purpose of the quality-control requirement is 
to prevent the public deception that would ensue from variant quality 
                                                          
 174. See id.  “The controversy here must be viewed in light of the innocence of 
each party in adopting the same trade-mark, the length of time the parties have used 
the mark, and the noncompetitive nature of their products.”  Id. at 671. 
Theoretically, the court did not dismiss the need for quality control, but the result of 
this license was a de facto upholding of a naked license. 
 175. Id. at 670–71. 
 176. E.g., Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1978); 
Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 177. 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 178. 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 179. Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1017–18. 
 180. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1113, 1121. 
 181. Id. at 1121–22. 
 182. 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 183. 768 F.2d at 1017. 
 184. 932 F.2d at 1121. 
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standards”185 and “[w]here the particular circumstances of the 
licensing arrangement persuade us that the public will not be 
deceived, we need not elevate form over substance and require the 
same policing rigor appropriate to more formal licensing.”186  In 
addition, the court specified that, where it “may justifiably rely on 
each parties’ . . . standards and procedures to ensure consistent 
quality, and no actual decline in quality standards is demonstrated, [it] 
would depart from the purpose of the law to find an abandonment 
simply for want of all the inspection and control formalities.”187 
This tendency to uphold licensing “regardless of actual control” 
where product quality remains consistent has grown in recent years.188  
In particular, an increasing number of courts have adopted the 
approach, first affirmed in Kentucky Fried Chicken,189 that “the 
consuming public must be the judge of whether the quality control 
efforts have been ineffectual,”190 thus shifting the analysis of the 
validity of licensing from quality control to consistent product quality.  
Still, no court has openly defied the theoretical validity of quality 
control or rejected the requirement so far.191  Instead, the judiciary 
has adopted a compromise in the form of a broad definition of 
control—that control can be implied as long as product quality is 
consistent and the public is not misled—to “skip” the analysis of 
quality control and either uphold agreements or declare them void. 
Yet, despite its clear advantage over the traditional approach—
avoiding the daunting task of defining control while focusing on the 
reality of the agreements—this trend has continued to be based on a 
case-by-case analysis rather than on a clear change in the traditional 
standard.  In addition, as with “adequate control,” courts have never 
defined what constitutes “consistent quality.”  Accordingly, in the 
absence of any statutory guideline on the matter,192 judicial positions 
                                                          
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. (emphasis added). 
 188. See, e.g., Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“It is not necessary, however, for the licenses themselves to contain 
a written provision for control; actual control by the licensor is sufficient.”). 
 189. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 190. Id. at 387. 
 191. Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (W.D. Wash. 
2007).  “The general rule is that a trademark owner who ‘fails to exercise adequate 
quality control over [a] licensee’ of a trademark creates a ‘naked license’ and 
thereby abandons the trademark.”  Id. at 1120 (citation omitted).  See Dep’t. of Parks 
& Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]ell-established trademark law imposes a duty upon the licensor to retain 
sufficient control over the mark to prevent public deception.”). 
 192. See generally Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, supra note 3, at 686 
(highlighting that “[n]either ‘quality’ nor ‘control’ is defined in the Lanham Act; 
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in this respect are also likely to vary, thus creating further 
inconsistency.193  Finally, this trend away from the enforcement of 
quality control has not been universally accepted and some courts 
have continued to assess agreements conservatively, thus leaving 
licensors, licensees, and competitors uncertain as to how to structure 
a valid license.194 
B. Consequences of the Absence of a Clear Definition of “Quality Control” 
As stressed earlier, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of 
quality control created much ambiguity in its judicial application.  In 
particular, courts often interpreted the requirement as they saw fit 
and stretched the concept of “control”—a concept per se open 
ended—to include any type of control, from “strict” to “adequate,” to 
“sufficient,” and eventually to “minimal” control.  Courts also used 
criteria such as consistent product quality or a close working 
relationship between the licensors and licensees to affirm that control 
could be “implied.”  Yet, while the judiciary generally favored 
licensing and found traces of control in most agreements, courts have 
never followed a totally consistent path on the issue and have 
continued to randomly adopt a more conservative approach in recent 
years.195 
As a result, much ambiguity continues to exist today as to what 
constitutes a valid license and how much control trademark owners 
should exercise to avoid the involuntary forfeiture of their marks.  
Accordingly, licensors are commonly advised to use caution and 
include explicit quality control provisions in their contracts in 
addition to exercising actual control over their licensees to avoid 
findings of naked licensing.196  Still, the degree of control that 
licensors ought to adopt remains uncertain in practice and often 
varies according to the circumstances of the individual cases and the 
                                                          
they are common law creatures whose evolution is incomplete and inconsistent”) 
(citation omitted). 
 193. See Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (stating that consistent quality means the product is of “‘the same 
character and source . . . as other goods previously purchased bearing the mark’” 
(quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:10)); Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, 
Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991) (indicating that consistent quality means 
“no actual decline in quality standards”), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Gorenstein 
Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that 
consistent quality means the product “really is the same good or service”). 
 194. E.g., Parks, supra note 5, at 531. 
 195. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 196. E.g., Ann E. Doll, Trademark Licensing:  Quality Control, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 203 (2001). 
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view of the individual court.197  For example, while some courts may 
be appeased by the consistent quality of licensed products, others 
may require evidence of actual, and even strict, control to avoid a 
finding of naked licensing.198  Furthermore, since part of the judiciary 
has indicated that third parties or even licensees can effectively 
monitor quality control, licensors face confusion as to who should 
monitor quality control—that is, whether they must exercise control 
directly—for licensing to be valid.199 
Besides creating many problems for trademark owners and 
licensees with respect to the drafting and enforcing of their licenses, 
the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of quality control has 
also allowed unfair competitors to present claims of invalid licensing 
as a defense against accusations of trademark infringement, arguing 
that trademark owners forfeit their rights as a result of insufficient 
quality control.200  Not surprisingly, this trend has increased the 
number of unnecessary and frivolous lawsuits to the detriment of the 
judicial system and the market overall.201  Here again, to avoid 
counterclaims of naked licensing in response to infringement claims, 
trademark owners are usually advised to be cautious and enforce 
quality control beyond what would normally be sufficient.  Yet, while 
this approach undoubtedly serves the purpose of proving the validity 
of the agreement at issue, it also comes with increased costs for 
trademark owners which, in many instances, are eventually 
transferred to the final prices of products, and thus directly affect 
consumers and the market.202 
Most likely in order to prevent this cost shifting and as a result of 
the growing importance of licensing, the judiciary has drifted away 
                                                          
 197. See id. at 205 (“How much control must the licensor exercise to assure 
consumers and to protect against mark abandonment?  The courts do not provide 
specific answers . . . .”); see also Dep’t. of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo, 
Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring “sufficient control”); Doebler’s 
Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 823 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring that 
licensors use “adequate control”); Bishops Bay Founders Group, Inc. v. Bishops Bay 
Apts., 301 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (requiring “actual control”). 
 198. E.g., Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2005); Barcamerica Int’l 
USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2002); Halo Mgmt., 
L.L.C. v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028–30 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Stanfield v. 
Osborne Indus., 839 F. Supp. 1499, 1504–05 (D. Kan. 1993). 
 199. See Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 
132 (1983) (“Federal law requires a trademark owner that licenses its trademark to 
exercise control over the quality of the trademarked goods produced and distributed 
by its licensees.”). 
 200. See discussion infra Part V.B.2. 
 201. See Parks, supra note 5, at 531.  See also William R. Woodward, Some 
Observations on Legitimate Control of the Nature and Quality of the Goods, 49 TRADEMARK 
REP. 609 (1959) (criticizing the quality control requirement). 
 202. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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from the strict interpretation of quality control to a more flexible 
approach since the adoption of the Lanham Act.203  Specifically, as 
detailed in the previous paragraphs, the majority of the courts have 
increasingly adopted a sort of rule of reason and a broad 
interpretation of “control” to assess licenses based on their possible 
effects on consumers and the market.204  As a result, courts have 
accepted that “sufficient” or even “minimal” control could satisfy the 
quality control requirement, and a growing number of judges have 
decided to focus on the substance and the result of the agreements, 
that is, the consistency of product quality, rather than on actual 
control.205 
Despite this growing trend, the traditional view that lack of control 
will result in naked licensing has nonetheless continued to be 
included in the language of most judicial decisions, proving courts 
generally reluctant to abandon quality control as the theoretical 
standard for valid licensing.206  Still, instead of assisting the courts in 
preventing fraudulent licensing and protecting consumers and the 
market from such fraud, this adherence to the traditional theoretical 
framework of licensing has increased the existing confusion by 
leaving room for courts to interpret quality control as they see fit 
based on the circumstances of the individual case.  Ultimately, this 
lack of a clear direction as to what constitutes a valid license 
continues to permit attacks among competitors, often regardless of 
consumer confusion, thus undermining the original goal of the 
requirement—protecting product quality and the purchasing 
public.207 
IV. THE INCREASING UNSUSTAINABILITY OF “QUALITY CONTROL” 
In the last hundred years, trademark licensing has become a vastly 
more important and lucrative tool for businesses.  As elaborated in 
Part I, modern licensing has also extended to nontraditional 
agreements such as collateral and promotional licensing, whose 
primary functions differ considerably from that of classical licensing, 
                                                          
 203. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 204. See Doebler’s Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 824–25 (3d Cir. 
2006) (requiring “reasonable” control). 
 205. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:58 (“[S]ome courts are reluctant to 
interfere with reasonable quality control arrangements agreed to by the parties and 
will often accept even minimal control . . . .”). 
 206. See supra Part II.A. 
 207. See University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d 
Cir. 1982), and Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
for examples of cases where the court found no consumer confusion and upheld the 
agreements at issue. 
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i.e., enhancing and exploiting the value of a mark per se.  Still, 
trademark law continues to subject all types of licensing to the same 
validity requirement that was used in the early twentieth century for 
classical licensing—quality control. 
Part IV considers the changes that have affected modern 
trademark licensing and the increasing unsustainability of quality 
control.  This Part also highlights how modern trademark practices 
are increasingly shifting toward licensing de facto without control.  
This shift is particularly apparent when one considers practices such 
as promotional licensing, trademark assignment and license-back, 
and the doctrine of licensee estoppel.  Considering that most foreign 
countries do not require quality control for valid licensing, this shift 
can also be attributed to the proliferation of international licensing 
and the growing importance of international trade. 
A. The Reality of Modern Trademark Licensing 
As indicated in Part I, the origin of trademark licensing can be 
traced back to the desire of trademark owners to increase the 
production of their existing products or to manufacture affiliated 
goods.208  Rather than increasing production or directly starting new 
manufacturing, however, trademark owners often found it more 
convenient to delegate this task to third parties, who specialized in 
the same field, through licensing agreements.  In addition to 
avoiding the costs and the risks of manufacturing, these agreements 
seemed more economical since licensees manufactured products 
more cheaply due to economies of scale and trademark owners still 
enjoyed a share of profits due to royalties.209  On their part, such 
arrangements also suited licensees, who often seek them directly to 
take advantage of the goodwill established by the licensed mark and 
thus avoid the risks connected to selling products independently 
under a new and unknown name.210 
In its essence, the above rationale has continued to characterize 
trademark licensing until present, and both licensors and licensees 
continue to enter agreements to save costs and increase their profits 
by exploiting the goodwill established by the licensed marks.211  Since 
                                                          
 208. See discussion supra Part I. 
 209. E.g., SCHLICHER, supra note 3, at 27. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Parks, supra note 5, at 533–35 (discussing the various theories that have 
justified trademark licensing over the years and suggesting the introduction of a new 
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its early days, however, trademark licensing has profoundly evolved.  
In particular, from an occasional business technique, licensing has 
become a fundamental pillar of the economy due to the changes in 
manufacturing, the rise of the consumer society, and the 
globalization of trade.212  Because of these changes, licensing has also 
developed into several types of agreements whose objectives are often 
different in scope from those of classical licensing.213 
Notably, modern trademark licensing has expanded beyond the 
production of the same or similar products to encompass a growing 
number of collateral and promotional products whose primary intent 
is that of enhancing, and exploiting, the image of the brand 
embodied by a mark.214  As critics have often pointed out, this 
increasing focus on trademarks as stand-alone business assets is 
additional evidence of the modern shift toward “propertizing” 
trademark rights.215  Still, well aware of the importance of trademarks 
as a source of revenues for businesses, particularly in an economy 
that is increasingly moving toward a service economy, both the courts 
and legislators have proven willing to support this shift as long as the 
public is not confused or misled and competition in the market 
continues to be fair.216 
Similarly, recent decades have also witnessed the growth of a 
practice closely related to licensing—franchising.217  Primarily used in 
the service and retail areas, franchising usually involves the licensing 
of famous marks along with the licensors’ technology and methods of 
operation.  Here again, however, the primary reason for this practice, 
both on the part of the franchisor and franchisee, is almost always the 
desire to exploit the fame and established goodwill of the licensed 
                                                          
 212. E.g., BATTERSBY & GRIMES, 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 27, at 3. 
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LAW. 289, 290–92 (1989); see also Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff’d, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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mark to attract a higher number of consumers.218  In some instances, 
franchising has reached such success that it constitutes the only 
activity carried out by the owners of the licensed mark.219  Not 
surprisingly, considering its growing importance in the economy, 
courts have also endorsed this practice and have upheld franchising 
as long as the agreements at issue do not damage the public or 
competition.220 
The increasing internationalization of trade and the need for 
businesses to expand their markets abroad have also deeply affected 
the interpretation of modern licensing.  In particular, as a result of 
the rising number of foreign countries involved in licensing 
programs, calls for the adoption of a common standard for the 
validity of licensing worldwide have been mounting in recent years as 
part of the general trend toward harmonizing intellectual property 
laws worldwide.221  These calls have interested primarily the United 
States, which retains quality control opposite to most other 
jurisdictions that do not provide for any similar requirement.222  
While the United States has so far formally resisted these calls, the 
growing international pressure for a change, along with the criticism 
of United States businesses, have certainly contributed to the recent 
shift toward licensing with minimal control, thus approaching 
national trademark law de facto to that of other countries. 
Finally, trademark owners and other parties in the market have 
increasingly used licensing as a strategic tool to reaffirm trademark 
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the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be permitted.”  TRIPS, supra, art. 
21. 
 222. For a reconstruction of various countries’ approaches on trademark 
licensing, see 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:  
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION §§ 715–720 (1975); see also MARY M. 
SQUYRES, 1–2 TRADEMARK PRACTICE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD §§ 6–17 (2007). 
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rights, settle trademark disputes, or enter agreements whose purpose 
is, in essence, market control or division of market shares.223  As noted 
earlier, this use of licensing to trade in trademarks as things per se 
has always been common in the marketplace,224 but recent decades 
have seen an unusual increase in this trend.225  Also in this respect, 
however, courts have generally tolerated these practices as long as the 
agreements included the formal provisions of quality control and the 
public was not negatively affected.226  Not surprisingly, this attitude 
has further eroded the real applicability of quality control and 
brought the judiciary a step closer to granting property rights in 
trademarks.227 
1. Promotional licensing and (the lack of) “quality control” 
As indicated above, the growing tendency toward recognizing, and 
exploiting, the intrinsic value of trademarks per se has deeply 
affected the traditional interpretation of licensing and quality 
control.  In particular, over the past decades, this trend has led to the 
rise of a new type of licensing—promotional licensing or trademark 
merchandising—whose purpose is not that of classical licensing, that 
is, to augment the quantity of the products originally produced by 
trademark owners, but that of building and enhancing brand image 
and consumer affiliation by licensing a mark for unrelated goods or 
services.228  Not surprisingly, because of its very nature, this type of 
licensing has profoundly challenged the enforcement of quality 
control.229 
Historically, the recognition of trademark merchandising dates 
back to a landmark decision by the Fifth Circuit in 1975:  Boston 
Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing.230  
In that case, Boston Hockey refused Dallas Cap permission to 
duplicate its logo on clothing based on a prior exclusive licensing 
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agreement, but Dallas Cap manufactured and sold clothing bearing 
the “B” mark regardless.231  By reversing the lower court’s decision,232 
the Fifth Circuit determined that Dallas Cap had infringed upon 
Boston Hockey’s mark and found likelihood of confusion233 in “the 
fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold 
them to the public knowing that the public would identify them as 
being the teams’ trademarks.”234  Hence, the court departed from the 
traditional interpretation of the Lanham Act and found that 
confusion existed because consumers associated the logos—the 
“triggering mechanism for the sale”235—with the team even in the 
absence of confusion as to the source of the products.236 
As expected, this decision was criticized as a step further toward 
establishing property rights in trademarks.237  Still, the court’s 
position reflected the growing importance of promotional licensing, 
which had already become a source of major revenues for trademark 
holders at that time, primarily for sport teams and colleges.238  This 
favorable trend continued during the following years and, even if 
many courts proved reluctant to directly affirm Boston Hockey and 
                                                          
 231. Id. at 1009. 
 232. Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 360 F. Supp. 459 
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 236. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012. 
 237. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 34, at 471–72 (“[T]he mark in these cases is 
rarely serving the traditional function of a trademark.  Rather than indicating 
something to the consumer about the source . . . of a product, the mark is the 
product . . . .”); see also id. at 473–76 (discussing the role of Boston Hockey and 
trademark licensing in establishing a property right in trademarks). 
 238. On the role of promotional licensing providing revenues for non-profit and 
for-profit institutions, see Keating, supra note 3, at 370–71. 
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enforce trademark rights based simply on consumer association,239 
the majority of the judiciary has adopted a sympathetic attitude 
toward merchandising.  In particular, courts developed the doctrine 
of confusion “as to the sponsorship,” according to which 
infringement can be found when consumers mistakenly believe that 
the trademark owners sponsored the products bearing identical or 
confusingly similar marks.240  Since consumer perception has 
increasingly become that trademark owners authorize promotional 
products, this doctrine has undoubtedly facilitated the protection of 
promotional licensing.241 
Besides broadening the scope of the likelihood of confusion, the 
spread of promotional licensing gave rise to several criticisms of the 
quality control requirement as the standard for the validity of 
trademark licensing.242  Specifically, it was argued that in promotional 
licensing, “the consumer is merely interested in attaining a symbol to 
display loyalty, affection or sympathy to a person, institution or cause 
and the quality-control function has no substantial value.”243  Thus, 
considering that most often trademark holders lack expertise in the 
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promotional goods industry, to require them “to inaugurate an 
imaginary quality-control program to satisfy legal requirements” 
would “elevate form over substance”244 to the detriment of licensors 
and licensees.  Additionally, critics stressed that retaining quality 
control in trademark merchandising would not benefit consumers, 
who often do not expect “a preordained quality level” for 
promotional products,245 but instead infringers, who could challenge 
infringement claims based on the inadequacy of quality control.246 
Still, despite these criticisms, the traditional standard for the 
validity of licensing has continued to hold, thus obliging licensors to 
implement quality control with respect to promotional licenses lest 
they face claims of naked licensing.247  Yet, as anticipated, this duty 
has often proved a formality rather than an actual exercise of 
control.248  Notably, even if most agreements included standard 
quality control provisions, licensors have usually relied on their 
licensees, and their knowledge of the promotional products, to 
ensure the quality of the marked goods.249  This has not translated, 
however, into a lack of interest for product quality and its consistency 
on the part of licensors.250  On the contrary, because promotional 
products aim precisely at building brand image, product quality has 
always been of utmost importance for trademark owners, who just 
choose to delegate the details of the production process, and thus the 
technicalities of quality control, to licensees.251 
Naturally, this trend greatly contributed to the general drifting 
away from a strict enforcement of quality control.  Well aware of 
these issues, the judiciary tried to fit promotional licensing under the 
current requirement by broadening the interpretation of “adequate 
control” and affirming that quality control could be effectively 
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exercised by third parties, including licensees.252  Yet, while accepting 
that control at large could also satisfy the legal requirement, courts 
have turned to the reality of the agreement at issue, and to the 
consistency of the product quality, to determine its validity.253 
2. Additional practices inconsistent with “quality control” 
Besides the rise of promotional licensing, additional trademark 
practices have contributed to the discontinuity between modern 
trademark licensing and the quality control requirement.  In 
particular, the past two decades have witnessed the expansion of the 
practice of assignment and license-back, where a trademark owner 
assigns her mark to an assignee, who in turn grants back to the 
assignor a license to continue using the mark.254  Most often, this type 
of agreement is used by trademark holders as a useful means to settle 
claims of trademark infringement255 or to secure priority over a mark 
in order to assert claims of opposition or trademark infringement.256  
During the past decades, trademark holders have also increasingly 
adopted this type of agreement to use their marks as collaterals for 
loans.257 
The rationale behind this practice, however, profoundly deviates 
from the traditional view of trademark law.258  Specifically, the 
primary purpose for the assignees/licensors is to acquire the control 
of the assigned mark and avoid claims of trademark abandonment, or 
laches and acquiescence on the part of future infringers, rather than 
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entering “substantially similar” businesses.259  On their part, 
assignors/licensees enter these transactions primarily to avoid a 
finding of trademark infringement and to continue using the mark at 
issue for the same products as prior to the signing of the agreement, 
rather than producing or distributing under a licensing program.  
Likewise, when a mark is used as collateral for a loan, the purpose of 
the agreement for the assignee/licensor/lender is just to acquire 
nominal control over the mark and, for the 
assignor/licensee/borrower to continue disposing of it as 
previously.260 
As expected, the judiciary has confirmed the validity of this 
procedure261 as a “‘well-settled commercial practice,’”262 further 
supporting the contention that the judiciary is moving away from 
quality control.  Theoretically, courts have continued to affirm that 
these transactions are valid only as long as they do not disrupt the 
continuity of the marked products and provided that 
assignees/licensors maintain control over their quality.263  Yet, these 
limits have proved sterile and formalistic,264 and the courts have 
generally relied on the language of the agreement regardless of the 
effective control exercised by licensors.265  In other words, by using 
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assignments and licenses-back, trademark owners and other market 
players bypass the legal requirement for trademark assignment and 
licensing under the implicit consent of the courts and exchange 
marks as “things” in the market place as they seem convenient. 
Finally, as additional evidence of the growing trend against 
findings of naked licensing, part of the judiciary has developed the 
so-called doctrine of “licensee estoppel,”266 according to which 
trademark licensees are estopped from challenging the validity of the 
licensed marks, inter alia, for lack of quality control.267  In particular, 
to safeguard licensors and licensing agreements, courts have held 
that a licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of the 
licensed mark for the whole duration of the agreement and, should 
he bring a claim against the mark afterwards, the claim should be 
limited to facts that arose after the expiration of the contract.268 
The rationale of this doctrine, according to the courts, is based on 
equitable principles269 and is aimed at balancing the interest of the 
public in challenging invalid marks against that of trademark owners 
in “predictable contractual relationships.”270  Yet, in practice, several 
courts have held that licensee estoppel foreclosed licensees from 
challenging the licensed mark on the ground that licensors failed to 
exercise adequate control over the licensing agreements.271  In 
addition, even if part of the judiciary has not agreed with this 
position,272 courts have consistently affirmed that licensees “should 
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during the license because estoppel barred the defense). 
 269. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. d (1995) (“[A] court 
remains free to consider the particular circumstances of the case, including the 
nature of the licensee’s claim and the terms of the license.”); see Idaho Potato 
Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 134–39 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 270. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:63. 
 271. See Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); Prof’l 
Golfers, 514 F.2d at 671; Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc. v. Pure Country, Inc., No. 
IP 01-1054-C-B/F, 2004 WL 3391781, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 26, 2004); STX, Inc. v. 
Bauer USA, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1500–01 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Estate of 
Biro v. Bic Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1386 (T.T.A.B. 1991); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. d, reporters’ note (1995) 
(“The case for estoppel is weaker when the licensee asserts a lack of control by the 
licensor over other users.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Sheila’s Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 123–24 
(5th Cir. 1973); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 318 F. Supp. 2d 923, 945–46 (C.D. Cal. 
2004), aff’d, 454 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2006); Westco Group, Inc. v. K. B. & Assocs., 128 
F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088–90 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
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not be permitted to rely upon [their] own conduct of selling non-
complying and inferior goods . . . as a basis for challenging the 
adequacy of quality control exercised by the trade mark owner.”273  
Similarly, courts have agreed that the licensees who resisted 
complying with quality standards are not permitted to challenge the 
validity of marks at issue, arguing that such non-compliance 
constitutes inadequate control.274 
In summary, even if the courts have emphasized that licensee 
estoppel aims at safeguarding “predictable contractual relationships,” 
this doctrine has increasingly permitted the judiciary to relax the 
application of quality control to the point of excluding licensees from 
bringing claims of naked license.  Admittedly, most often licensees 
may not have a direct interest in bringing such claims since they also 
have a specific interest in the validity of the licensed mark.275  Still, in 
some instances, they may also have valid reasons for such 
challenges.276  As a result, this doctrine confirms the growing 
inclination of the courts to treat marks as property, and as such, to 
apply equitable principles to them, including overlooking lack of 
quality control and upholding the licensing contractual relationship 
as long as it does not bring harm to the public. 
B. Toward a De Facto Abandonment of “Quality Control”? 
In light of the above, it seems clear that modern trademark 
licensing is drifting away from, and in some instances has already de 
facto abandoned, the requirement of quality control as traditionally 
intended by the courts and the Lanham Act in 1946.277  As indicated 
in Part II, this trend has directly followed the general shift toward the 
“propertization” of trademark protection and the resulting 
willingness of courts and legislators to protect trademarks as things 
per se on the basis of the impairment of the marks, regardless of 
consumer confusion.278 
Notably, and well aware of the growing importance of licensing 
both as a business technique and source of revenues, courts have 
repeatedly proven reluctant in adopting a conservative approach to 
trademark licensing and requiring a strict application of quality 
                                                          
 273. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:63 (citing Leatherwood Scopes Int’l v. 
Leatherwood, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699 (T.T.A.B. 2002); Westco Group, 128 F. Supp. 
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 274. Id. 
 275. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 276. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:63. 
 277. Parks, supra note 5, at 545; Lemley, supra note 17, at 1714. 
 278. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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control.279  Likewise, the judiciary has generally favored, or at least 
tolerated, practices such as merchandising and assignment and 
license-back, whose primary objectives are to exploit the value, and 
control the use, of trademarks per se.280  In addition, the judiciary 
itself has applied equitable principles to trademark licensing and 
developed the doctrine of licensee estoppel to protect licensors and 
licensing contracts regardless of the lack of quality control.281 
Still, despite this shift toward protecting trademark rights in gross, 
the judiciary has never officially repealed or formally criticized the 
current standard for the validity of licensing.282  Instead, courts have 
adopted a pragmatic position that reaches a compromise between the 
need to foster business endeavors and the traditional rationale of 
trademark law—protecting consumers and the market.283  A growing 
number of courts have increasingly focused on the final quality of 
products when assessing the validity of licensing and have “assumed” 
that control was exercised where quality remained consistent and the 
public was not deceived, even if licensors did not strictly monitor 
their licensees.284 
Undoubtedly, this approach has allowed the judiciary to provide 
licensors and licensees with a more flexible standard without the 
need to challenge the current requirement.285  Despite this obvious 
advantage, however, the shift toward licensing de facto with minimal 
or no control has eroded, slowly but steadily, the scope of quality 
                                                          
 279. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 280. See Keating, supra note 3, at 372; see also Franklyn, Liability for Trademark 
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CALLMAN, supra note 7, § 19:48)); see also discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
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Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kitterman, supra note 140, at 
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 283. See discussion supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 284. See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th 
Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 
768 F.2d 1001, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985); Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc 
Canning Co., 330 F.2d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 285. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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control, which has increasingly been reduced to a sterile 
requirement.286  Still, since quality control continues to be the formal 
standard for the validity of licensing, a minority of the courts have 
continued to require actual proof of control to uphold licensing 
agreements, thus creating further uncertainty as to what constitutes a 
valid license.287  As elaborated in Part V, this uncertainty is no longer 
sustainable and the time has come to provide a consistent standard 
for the validity of licensing that will bridge the gap between the 
current de facto situation, the desire of licensors and licensees to 
exploit their marks, and the need to protect consumers and the 
market against unscrupulous licensing.288 
V. THE CASE FOR ABANDONING “QUALITY CONTROL” 
As described in Parts II, III, and IV, the general trend seems to 
favor a flexible standard for the validity of licensing.  Since the 
implementation of the Lanham Act, courts have adopted an 
increasingly broad interpretation of quality control and accepted 
almost any evidence to declare licensing valid.  Additionally, they 
have required a very high burden of proof to declare the forfeiture of 
trademark rights and have also upheld licensing de facto without 
control.  This trend, however, has not established a clear path of 
acceptance for licensing without control, and the outcomes of 
judicial decisions are still proving inconsistent.289 
This Part stresses the failures of the current requirement and 
advocates for a change allowing licensing “with or without control” as 
long as the public is not deceived.290  This Part argues that this change 
                                                          
 286. See Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121 (requiring only “adequate control” for 
trademark licensing); Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 
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 287. Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2005); Barcamerica Int’l, 289 
F.3d at 596–97; Halo Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028–31 
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 288. See generally Parks, supra note 5, at 538–41 (discussing the problems created 
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 289. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 290. Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 828–41.  As I have 
indicated above, see supra note 13, the arguments in favor of a legislative change 
toward a regime of trademark assignment “with or without goodwill” and those in 
favor of licensing “with or without control” are partially similar, in particular with 
respect to the failures and the ambiguities surrounding the respective requirements.  
As a result, the reader may encounter some similarities between the main text of this 
section and the corresponding footnotes, and the text and footnotes in Calboli, 
Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 828–41.  As indicated earlier, however, all 
the arguments and reference used in this section are originally targeted toward 
supporting my claim in favor of licensing “with or without control.” 
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will restore consistency between the standard for the validity of 
licensing and its subsequent interpretation and enforcement.  
Despite common criticism, this change will not adversely affect 
consumers, for the courts have alternative and better tools to protect 
the purchasing public.  Additionally, it will prevent superfluous legal 
actions initiated by competitors whose ultimate goal is not to 
safeguard consumers, but to control the course of trade.291 
A. The Intrinsic Flaws of “Quality Control” 
As repeatedly noted, the adoption of the quality control 
requirement has traditionally rested on the belief that requiring 
trademark owners to exercise such control increases the chances of 
continuity in product quality.292  As this Article has highlighted, 
however, the reality of trademark practice has called into question 
this assumption, and courts have interpreted and enforced the 
quality control standard inconsistently at best.293  As a result, the 
original goal of the requirement—protecting consumers and 
competition—has often not been achieved, whereas trademark 
owners and licensees continue to wonder what constitutes valid 
licensing under the current standard.294  Once again, the lack of a 
consistent and clear definition of what represents “quality control” 
primarily accounts for such uncertainty.295  Not surprisingly, this 
uncertainty has brought increasing criticism, calling for the 
abandonment of the current requirement.296 
The reasons for much of this uncertainty can be uncovered by 
revisiting the rationale of the requirement and, in particular, by 
highlighting its obvious flaws.  Notably, despite the general intention 
behind it, the adoption of quality control has never included a direct 
prohibition that licensees do not modify product quality.  Instead, the 
letter of the law has only required that licensors “control” licensees 
with respect to the “nature and quality” of the marked products so as 
                                                          
 291. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 373; see also Noel Gillespie, Licensing and the 
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to not “deceive the public.”297  In other words, trademark owners have 
been legally obligated only to monitor their licensees who, in turn, 
have been obligated only to refrain from using the mark 
misleadingly.298  As a result, quality control has never truly 
guaranteed, but merely facilitated, continuity in product quality, in 
the hope that, because of trademark owners’ control, licensees would 
not change product quality or face claims of invalid licensing.299 
In addition, the current requirement imposes the duty to maintain 
consistent product quality only to trademark owners that are licensors 
and not to all trademark owners.  In other words, trademark law has 
never questioned the ability of non-licensor trademark owners to 
change the quality of their products300 provided that the public is not 
deceived,301 yet the law has historically restricted the ability of 
trademark licensors to effect such changes.  Not surprisingly, 
licensors and practitioners have lamented this differential treatment, 
for which no sound legal reasoning has been offered and which 
cannot “be justified in the name of the public interest”302 since the 
public “has no collective ‘right’ to prevent licensors from making the 
same subjective business decisions concerning the quality of marked 
                                                          
 297. See Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000); see also  Bannon, Revisiting “The 
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,” supra note 15, at 77 (“The consumer 
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 301. Deceptive trademarks are subject to cancellation according to section 14(c).  
Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act also 
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§ 1052(a).  E.g., In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Bureau 
Nat’l Interprofessionnel Du Cognac v. Int’l Better Drinks Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1610, 1616 (T.T.A.B. 1988). 
 302. Parks, supra note 5, at 537. 
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goods as are made by non-licensors.”303  Furthermore, the current 
requirement does not consider that, at times, quality variations may 
be required, or suitable, to respond to changes in product standards 
and market demands.304  Accordingly, to prevent licensors and 
licensees from changing product quality could possibly affect their 
very existence in the marketplace.305  As a result, to deny licensors and 
licensees this flexibility may eventually undermine their abilities to 
compete in the marketplace. 
The increasing use of promotional licensing among many sectors 
of the market has brought additional criticisms to quality control.306  
As repeatedly noted, this type of licensing usually involves the use of a 
mark on unrelated products307 whose quality can rarely be monitored 
effectively by trademark owners because of their lack of direct 
expertise in the field.  Instead, trademark owners delegate such 
control to their licensees and simply ensure that all products bearing 
their marks share the same quality once in the market.308  
Accordingly, if “[i]n promotional trademark licensing, failure of the 
licensor to maintain quality-control of the product . . . does not 
constitute . . . misrepresentation,”309 it is thus increasingly difficult to 
sustain the idea that the same requirement should be applied to 
traditional trademark licensing.  Similarly, the increasing use of 
trademark strategies such as assignments and licenses-back, and the 
development of judicial doctrines such as licensee estoppel have also 
called into question the validity of quality control and the extent to 
which it satisfies the current needs of the marketplace.310 
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To respond to these problems, courts have opted for a realistic 
approach, defined quality control broadly,311 and accepted a vast 
range of evidence to prove that control had, in fact, been exercised.  
Courts have also increasingly focused their analysis on whether the 
public has been deceived as the result of variations in product quality.  
Lastly, they have refrained from voiding licensing agreements with 
the exception of cases where consumer deception was beyond any 
doubt.312 
As indicated earlier, the main reason courts have been hesitant to 
declare trademark licenses invalid is their fear that trademark 
infringers will exploit this argument to support a defense that their 
accusers have “unclean hands.”313  In other words, rather than 
protecting consumers damaged by differences in the quality of the 
marked products, quality control most often protects infringers who 
use the requirement as a counterclaim to divert the court’s attention 
from the infringement itself.314  Indeed, most courts agree that 
consumers do not have standing under the Lanham Act.315  Similarly, 
nobody, not even the USPTO, has the duty to monitor whether or 
not trademark owners comply with the requirement of quality 
control, and licensors are not obliged to present evidence of such 
control to anyone.316  Certainly, this lack of supervision and the fact 
that the enforcement of quality control is left to the discretion of 
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442 F.2d 686, 691–94 (2d Cir. 1971); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 27:39 
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 316. See Jennifer Rudis Deschamp, Has the Law of Products Liability Spoiled the True 
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competitors (and defendants) have contributed to the uncertainty 
surrounding the requirement.317 
Finally, courts’ reluctance to embrace the quality control standard 
stems from the serious implication of voiding a trademark license.  If 
a trademark owner has allowed another party to invalidly use its 
mark, the mark may be declared abandoned or cancelled, and the 
trademark owner will have forfeited its right to use the mark.  Thus, 
“a finding of abandonment through insufficient control means that 
multiple sources can sell products . . . of varying quality under the 
mark, enhancing the risks of consumer deception and confusion.”318  
Paradoxically, this would harm rather than help consumers, for 
without the guarantee that a mark stands for a certain product of a 
certain quality, consumers will have to invest more time and money 
into deciding which products to buy.  In other words, if a mark is 
cancelled and returned to the public domain where multiple parties 
may freely use it, consumers will have a very difficult time identifying 
the product they originally sought from the many products that now 
bear the same mark, and they will thus face a greater chance of 
deception than if the licensing agreement had been upheld as 
valid.319 
B. The Need for a Better Rule on Modern Trademark Licensing 
In the light of the above, it seems undisputable that the current 
standard for the validity of trademark licensing has been reduced, in 
practice, to a formalistic and confusing requirement, which is also out 
of touch with the needs of modern manufacturing and distribution.320  
As this Article has demonstrated, the judiciary is just as responsible 
for this situation.  Courts have in fact interpreted quality control 
erratically and inconsistently, and, in some instances, have declared 
agreements valid even without control as long as the public is not 
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confused.321  Recent trademark practices such as promotional 
licensing, assignments and licenses-back, and the doctrine of licensee 
estoppel have also proven incompatible with the traditional 
interpretation of quality control.322 
As elaborated earlier, this judicial indulgence toward licensing can 
best be explained by considering the growing importance and use of 
this practice in the economy during the past century.323  Generally, 
besides adopting a broad interpretation and accepting a vast range of 
evidence to prove the existence of control, courts have also 
established very high burdens of proof for claimants before declaring 
trademark rights forfeited due to naked licensing.324  Only in a 
minority of cases has the judiciary reverted to a conservative 
approach and declared licensing without control invalid.  Still, 
trademark owners and licensees continue to be left with many doubts 
as to the conditions upon which they can license their marks or use 
them, and predicting judicial responses represents a risky, and 
potentially costly, business.325 
This situation must be addressed.  Today’s economy heavily relies 
on the use of licensing in most sectors of the market, both for the 
production and distribution of goods and services, and such 
uncertainty clearly jeopardizes the ability of trademark owners and 
licensees to compete in the marketplace. Thus, “[i]f it is true that 
ambiguities [have always] characterize[d] trademark law because of 
its social, emotional, and irrational basis,”326 the legal system cannot 
impose upon trademark owners and licensees the burden to rely on 
“an unpredictable [judicial] rule of reason”327 to decide how to 
structure valid licensing agreements.  Accordingly, this Article 
advocates for a change in the current rule in favor of a new, and 
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better, standard, which will resolve most of the current controversy 
and provide more flexibility for competitors, while still protecting the 
public against confusion and deception. 
1. It is time to adopt licensing with or without “quality control” 
Considering the current situation, a change toward a regime of 
more flexible licensing, and particularly of licensing “with or without 
quality control,” seems to represent the only viable solution to resolve 
the intrinsic flaws of the present standard.328  Accordingly, following 
the position de facto adopted by part of the judiciary, this Article 
suggests that licenses should be considered automatically valid 
regardless of trademark owners’ actual control when product quality 
stays the same or when, if variations in quality have occurred, 
licensors and licensees have taken all necessary measures to inform 
consumers to prevent deception.329  In particular, considering that 
quality control has traditionally found its statutory basis in the 
definition of “related company” as per Section 45, this Article 
advocates for an amendment to the language of Section 45 by erasing 
any reference to the “control” that trademark owners should 
supposedly exercise.330  Instead, a “related company” should be 
defined as “any person whose use of a mark is authorized by the 
owner of the mark provided that such mark is not used to deceive the 
public with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services 
on or in connection with which the mark is used.” 331 
                                                          
 328. Parks, supra note 5, at 558. 
Elimination of the quality control requirement will result in the consistent 
treatment of licensing and non-licensing trademark owners.  Licensors will 
no longer be forced to attempt adherence to indefinite standards of “quality” 
and “control,” at the risk of a judicial holding (however rare) that a licensed 
mark has been “abandoned” through uncontrolled licensing.  Rather, like 
their non-licensing counterparts, licensors will be free to market goods and 
services at quality levels consistent with their own business judgment. 
Id. 
 329. See, e.g., Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 454 F.3d 975, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A 
license agreement need not contain an express quality control provision because 
trademark law, rather than the contract itself, confers on the licensor the right and 
obligation to exercise quality control.”).  But note that most cases do not designate a 
license as “automatically” valid, but rather describe conditions in which an 
agreement may be determined to be automatically invalid. 
 330. Currently, section 45 defines “related company” as “any person whose use of 
a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality 
of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.”  Lanham 
Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
 331. See Parks, supra note 5, at 568 (advocating for a similar change to the 
definition of “related company” in section 45 so that the term “would be construed 
to include any entity which has been granted a license by the trademark owner, 
regardless of the license terms”). 
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Despite the criticisms expressed by some scholars and part of the 
judiciary against “free” licensing,332 the suggested amendment will 
provide a better standard for the validity of licensing, while still 
fostering consumer protection.  First, this amendment will bring the 
statute in line with the majority of judicial decisions and business 
reality.  More importantly, however, it will eliminate the major flaw in 
the current rule—the impossibility to define quality control 
consistently.  Instead, the proposed amendment will focus the validity 
of licensing directly on whether the public has been deceived, thus 
providing a much clearer guideline for trademark owners compared 
to the erratic judicial interpretation of quality control.333 
This new approach would also close a loophole often used by 
trademark infringers to escape liability.  As stressed earlier, 
defendants in trademark infringement suits often use the quality 
control standard to argue that plaintiffs invalidly licensed their mark 
and thus have “unclean hands” and have forfeited their claim of 
trademark infringement.334  Under the new standard proposed by this 
Article, defendants would still be entitled to question the validity of 
the license at issue, but the validity would not rest on the amount of 
control exercised by the licensor.  On the contrary, the validity of the 
license would depend on whether the public would be deceived when 
purchasing the marked product sold by the licensee.335  As a result, 
the public and the market will benefit from this change since 
trademark owners will focus on actual quality and consumer 
deception rather than on control, while litigants will likely refrain 
from bringing frivolous suits, thus saving costs and time to the legal 
system as a whole.336 
The proposed change in the definition of Section 45 will also bring 
uniformity between the statutory definition of “related company” and 
the language of Section 5 of the Lanham Act.  As indicated earlier, 
                                                          
 332. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1710–11; see also In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 
F.2d 207, 208–09 (6th Cir. 1986); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 
676–77 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 333. See discussion supra Part III; see also Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra 
note 13, at 834 (propping up a new rule of assignment “with or without” goodwill). 
 334. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 335. To elaborate on the scenarios in the Introduction, courts will thus invalidate 
the license at issue and possibly declare the forfeiture of trademark rights if two 
identically looking HARLEY-DAVIDSON T-shirts or YANKEES hats, which are sold in 
the same premises on the same shelf, prove to be of different quality.  Likewise, 
courts will invalidate the license if the GE phone or SAMSUNG television proves to 
be of different quality than the item in the show room or advertised in the 
newspaper. 
 336. Parks, supra note 5, at 558; Friedman, supra note 15, at 364 (generalizing 
some of the practical problems that courts and consumers face when trying to grasp 
the meaning of the current quality control standard). 
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Section 5 does not mention or require direct control on the part of 
licensors over their licenses.337  The provision simply requires that the 
mark not be “used in such a manner as to deceive the public.”338  
Considering that several courts have already adopted a similar 
position in practice and either found evidence of control when 
control was minimal or nonexistent, or directly stated that actual 
control was not necessary, a change toward licensing with or without 
control will have the beneficial effect of bringing the language of the 
provision in line with reality.339 
Furthermore, a change in the current requirement will restore 
consistency between the requirement for the validity of licensing and 
modern trademark practices such as promotional licensing and, inter 
alia, assignments and licenses-back.  As elaborated in Part IV, even 
amidst the skepticism of some courts and scholars,340 the economic 
relevance of promotional licensing is only destined to grow,341 and a 
clearer standard for the validity of this practice is much needed both 
for consumers and trademark owners.  Similarly, despite the 
argument that trademark rights do not exist in gross, trademarks are 
increasingly treated, and exchanged, as things in and of themselves, 
as demonstrated daily by modern trademark practices.342  
Accordingly, to adopt a more flexible standard for the validity of 
licensing that still focuses primarily on consumer deception will 
benefit the market while providing clearer guidance for licensors and 
licensees. Equally importantly, this new standard will also bring 
national trademark law closer to the approach followed by the 
                                                          
 337. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 338. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000); see Keating, supra note 3, at 378 
(stating that the Lanham Act merely prohibits the use of a trademark to 
misrepresent goods, and does not expressly require quality control). 
 339. See Parks, supra note 5, at 531 (“[T]he quality control requirement should be 
abandoned as a legal fiction that lacks a sound theoretical foundation, has no 
practical benefits, and is inconsistent with the realities of the modern market 
place.”). 
 340. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 34, at 466 (criticizing the theoretical 
justification of trademark merchandising). 
 341. Marks, supra note 5, at 646–47. 
Over the last few years, the volume of merchandising activity has grown by 
several hundred percent as a few specific examples will show.  In 1978, Walt 
Disney Productions reported $21.3 million in licensing royalties based on 
$427 million in retail sales of licensed products.  In 1983, Yves Saint Laurent 
S.A. showed a gross income of $27 million, of which $17 million was derived 
from licensing. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 342. See id. at 652 (discussing the development and growth of promotional 
trademark licensing). 
  
2007] THE SUNSET OF “QUALITY CONTROL” 399 
majority of other countries, thus eliminating many inconsistencies to 
the advantage of international trade.343 
Lastly, the suggested amendment will directly benefit consumers by 
enhancing the ability of trademark owners to compete in the 
marketplace.  Under the new rule, licensors and licensees will be 
allowed to alter the quality of the marked products to satisfy not just 
legal requirements but also market demand and consumer needs,344 
as long as they apply these changes to the whole production,345 or the 
public could otherwise be deceived.346  Trademark owners will also 
enjoy more flexibility in monitoring their licensees and, more 
importantly, will not fear unfounded claims of naked licensing in 
response to their legitimate claims of infringement.  This could save 
costs in administering licenses and licensing portfolios and, in turn, 
these savings could translate into cheaper prices for marked products 
to the benefit of consumers.347 
The proposed amendment will also benefit consumers by 
preventing cases where licensors and licensees decide to discontinue 
production due to the fact that their mark has been cancelled 
because of lack of quality control, regardless of whether or not the 
public was deceived.  In these occurrences, consumers and 
competition are greatly affected since the number of products 
available in the market is reduced, even in the absence of consumer 
confusion.  Yet, to allow licensing “with or without” control will limit 
these occurrences to truly unscrupulous agreements to the benefit of 
consumers, who will not otherwise see their product choices 
reduced.348  The same applies when, considering that trademark 
cancellation allows other interested parties to use the mark, licensors 
                                                          
 343. See 2 LADAS, supra note 222, §§ 715–720; see also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 344. See Marks, supra note 5, at 651 (“Trademark theory should provide for 
consumer protection, but it should also be flexible enough to permit satisfactory 
adaptation to new situations.” (quoting William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, 
Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Control, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 114 (1980))); see 
also Hanak, supra note 8, at 367. 
 345. Differences in quality standards required by state laws would represent the 
only exception to this rule.  Friedman, supra note 15, at 373. 
 346. Interestingly, courts have denied consumer confusion in cases where such 
confusion was, instead, very clear.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 853 A.2d 
40, 44 (Vt. 2004) (dismissing a consumer fraud claim because of the fact that the 
public was not aware that parts of Nissan Quests were produced by Ford Motor 
Company); Szajna v. Gen. Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760, 771 (Ill. 1986) (denying 
that the mark “Pontiac Ventura” was per se a guarantee of the quality of the car 
components). 
 347. See Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 834 (considering 
similar arguments to support assignment “with or without goodwill”). 
 348. For a discussion on the economic aspects of trademark protection, 
particularly with respect to the distinctive function of trademarks, see discussion, 
supra Part II.A. 
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and licensees have to incur extra costs to rename their products and 
market them under the new name.  Not surprisingly, these extra costs 
impact the ability of trademark owners and licensees to compete in 
the market and ultimately work to the detriment of consumers, who 
eventually will carry parts of these costs.349  To amend the current 
requirement as suggested will thus prevent these additional costs in 
most circumstances by limiting trademark cancellation to agreements 
that are truly misleading and unfair for the market. 
2. Protecting consumers and the market under the new rule 
Despite the many benefits listed above, any shift toward licensing 
“with or without control” must still guarantee that the public will 
receive accurate information about the quality of the marked 
products.  In other words, even under the suggested amendment, 
licensors and licensees should not be able to use “free” licensing to 
deceive or confuse purchasers, because the primary function of 
trademark law is to protect consumers and the market.350  As stressed 
earlier, consumers are not “legally entitled to receive goods and 
services of the same quality,”351 yet licensors and licensees cannot 
betray their trust on certain marks by providing, misleadingly and 
without notice, products qualitatively different from those previously 
identified by them.352 
A shift toward licensing with or without control, however, will not 
affect the protection that is currently available to consumers and the 
market, should licensors and licensees decide to use a mark to 
defraud the public trust.  In particular, from a general standpoint, an 
amendment to the current language of the Lanham Act will leave 
unaffected the current provisions against consumer fraud; that is, 
licensors and licensees will be as liable to consumers for the quality of 
their products as they are today under the current standard.  
Accordingly, the public and the market will continue to rely upon the 
remedies granted by consumer protection and product liability laws 
                                                          
 349. See Marks, supra note 5, at 648–49, on the costs of licensing.  Marks 
considers, in particular, the costs incurred by companies that are less sophisticated in 
policing and controlling a popular trademark in licensing contexts.  Id. 
 350. See Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 836 (stressing that a 
regime of assignment in gross will not necessarily detriment competition). 
 351. Id. at 836. 
 352. On the contrary, trademark owners should be held liable for consumer fraud 
and face the civil and criminal consequences provided by the law.  For some of the 
relevant provisions, see, for example, Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2000), and Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2085 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965) (amended 1998 by RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 9). 
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against any misleading use of a mark.353  Likewise, even if more 
enforcement could be desirable in these areas of the law in 
practice,354 those engaged in abusive licensing will continue to be 
held liable for commercial fraud, and pay the consequences provided 
by civil and criminal laws.355 
The proposed change will also leave untouched the role currently 
played by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) under Section 
14(5) of the Lanham Act356 in protecting consumers against the 
misleading use of trademarks.357  Specifically, according to the 
provision, “the Federal Trade Commission may apply to cancel . . . 
any mark”358 on the grounds that, inter alia, a mark has become 
generic, has been registered fraudulently, or misrepresents the 
source of the marked products.359  Even if the FTC has rarely 
enforced this rule,360 a transition towards a system of “free” licensing 
will not affect its ability to act and cancel trademark registration 
should any of the conditions listed in the law arise in practice.361 
                                                          
 353. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (regulating product warranties for the public 
and outlining the role of the Federal Trade Commission); id. § 2051 (relating 
congressional findings and statements of purpose designed to protect and assist the 
public against risks “associated with consumer products”); see also Franklyn, The 
Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, supra note 3, at 675 (arguing that trademark licensors 
should be subjected to liability under the apparent manufacturer doctrine when a 
licensor induces consumers to believe that the licensor controlled the standards for 
manufacturing the product). 
 354. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, supra note 3, at 721. 
 355. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2069 (providing civil penalties for the violation of 15 
U.S.C. § 2068); id. § 2070 (providing for criminal penalties for the violation of 15 
U.S.C. § 2068); see also Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 841 
(noting that the same provisions will continue to operate in a regime of assignment 
“with or without goodwill”). 
 356. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2000); see Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 
13, at 841 n.360 (highlighting the role of the FTC with respect to the misleading use 
of trademarks in the context of trademark assignment). 
 357. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611–12 (1946) (reaffirming the 
power of the FTC in these areas).  “The Commission has wide discretion in its choice 
of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in this area of 
trade and commerce.”  Id. at 611. 
 358. Lanham Act § 14(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5). 
 359. Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  The FCT can also cancel a 
certification mark, at any time, when the mark is in use without the owner’s control 
or if the mark’s use may mislead the public.  Lanham Act § 14(5), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1064(5). 
 360. See Hanak, supra note 8, at 373 (stressing that “the Commission rarely has 
used the authority granted” while pointing out one “notable” exception found in 
Bart Schwartz International Textiles, Ltd. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F.2d 665 
(C.C.P.A. 1961)). 
 361. Bart Schwartz, 289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961), represents the most noticeable 
example where the FTC used its authority to restore fair market competition and 
consumer protection under the Lanham Act.  “The obligation which the Lanham 
Act imposes on an applicant is that he will not make knowingly inaccurate or 
knowingly misleading statements in the verified declaration forming a part of the 
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In addition, the role of supervision of the FTC is not limited to the 
wording of the Lanham Act.  Notably, under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”),362 the FTC is granted the authority 
to prevent, in general, acts of unfair competition.  This capacity also 
extends to all instances where a mark is used to deceive or confuse 
the public.363  In this respect, the FTC has often enforced its power, 
warning trademark owners not to use their marks misleadingly and 
prohibiting “the use of trademarks that inherently are deceptive.”364  
Here again, the proposed standard will not affect the status quo, and 
the FTC will continue to operate in the same capacity to protect 
consumers and competition in the marketplace.365 
Furthermore, from a strict trademark law standpoint, occurrences 
involving abusive licenses—whether under a regime of “free” 
licensing or “with quality control”—will continue to fall within the 
provision of Sections 14 and 45 of the Lanham Act, and courts can 
continue to use these rules to declare unfair licensing invalid and 
cancel the corresponding marks.366  Even more importantly, the 
                                                          
application for registration.”  Id. at 669.  See FTC v. Wolf, No. 94-8119, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1760, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 1996). 
 362. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 363. According to Section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA, “[u]nfair methods of competition 
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  Section 5(n) 
defines “unfair” practices as practices that “cause . . . or [are] likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”  Id. § 45(n). 
 364. Hanak, supra note 8, at 373.  Interesting examples in this respect are R. 
Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786, 788 (C.C.P.A 1964), where 
the court denied registration for potentially misleading mark, and Gaffrig Performance 
Indus. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., No. 99 C 7822, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23018, at *58 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2003), where the court canceled a misleading trademark 
registration.  “It is well settled by the decisions of this court and other courts of 
competent jurisdiction that no trademark rights can be acquired in a trademark that 
is deceptive or deceptively misdescriptive.”  Neumann, 326 F.2d at 788. 
 365. In addition, the suggested amendment will not increase the cost of FTC’s 
supervision over misleading uses of trademarks since it does not add any new power 
to the FTC.  Simply, it demands that the FTC will continue to control the correct 
functioning of the market as it has done, or should have done, until present.  See 
Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 841 (stating that a rule of 
assignment “with or without goodwill” will not affect the FTC’s ability to regulate the 
market); see also Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising:  A Comparative Study of Public 
Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 20–25 (1985); 
Thomas L. Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger:  The Return of Portfolio-Effects 
Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1299 (2003) (briefly outlining the FTC’s role in the 
marketplace). 
 366. See Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 837 (making a similar 
argument against the rule of assignment “with goodwill”); cf. Dawn Donut Co. v. 
Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“If the licensor is not 
compelled to take some reasonable steps to prevent misuses of his trademark in the 
hands of others the public will be deprived of its most effective protection against 
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proposed amendment will leave untouched the provision of Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act under which competitors can bring civil 
suits, at any time, if a mark has been registered fraudulently or is used 
to mislead the public as to the origin of the marked products.367  
Accordingly, competitors will continue to be able to call upon this 
rule to bring actions against abusive licensors and licensees368 and 
courts will retain the ability to cancel, or declare abandoned, the 
marks at issue also under a standard of licensing “with or without 
control.”369 
Simply put, under the proposed standard, courts will focus directly 
on the result of licensing—whether consumers are confused or 
misled—rather than on the conduct of licensors—whether they 
exercised quality control—to assess the validity of the agreements at 
                                                          
misleading uses of a trademark. . . . Clearly the only effective way to protect the 
public where a trademark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor the 
affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”). 
 367. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000): 
(a) Civil action 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation 
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his 
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her 
or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be 
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or 
is likely to be damaged by such act. 
Id.; see also Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 837–38 (noticing that 
the provision will continue to operate under a regime of assignment “with or without 
goodwill”). 
 368. See supra note 315.  As indicated by 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 27:39, “[a]t 
one point in Congress, a House version of the bill which eventually led to the 
Trademark Law Revision Act and the rewriting of § 43(a) contained language 
expressly giving consumers the right to sue for a violation of § 43(a).”  Id. (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028, at 13–15 (1988)).  However, “the provision was deleted in a 
House-Senate Conference Committee.”  Id.  McCarthy also points out that 
“Representative Kastenmeier inserted a statement in the record to the effect that he 
believed that consumers have standing under the case law and that the deleted 
consumer standing proposal would only have ‘clarified that law.’”  Id. (citing 134 
CONG. REC. H10419 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).  In 
support of consumer standing under the Lanham Act, see Tawnya Wojciechowski, 
Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own:  An Argument for Congressional Action Regarding 
Consumer Standing for False Advertising Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 SW. U. L. REV. 
213 (1994). 
 369. Unfortunately, courts have never held that inconsistent product quality 
amounts to a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act under the theory that 
inconsistent product quality misrepresents the marked good or services.  Parks, supra 
note 5, at 552–53. 
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issue.  Courts will then assess variation in product quality as part of a 
general assessment of the validity of the contracts under scrutiny and, 
to this end, will use the provision of Sections 14 or 45, or Section 
43(a), to establish whether any existing difference is likely to deceive 
the purchasing public.  Since, however, trademark licensing often 
extends to unrelated products, courts should consider quality 
variations primarily among the same kind of products—that is, 
RALPH LAUREN sunglasses versus RALPH LAUREN sunglasses, and 
not other RALPH LAUREN products.  Specifically, courts should 
evaluate whether any existing difference in quality is likely to deceive 
the public by using factors similar to those that are traditionally used 
to establish trademark infringement.370  Ultimately, courts should 
invalidate any agreement where even a minor part of the public is 
likely to be deceived by a different product quality.  Courts should 
allow agreements to stand when confusion and deception cannot be 
found.371 
Generally, when assessing the consistency of product quality, courts 
should also consider whether any variation in such quality is required 
by law372 and should presume licenses valid as long as all new products 
                                                          
 370. For a general overview of the factors taken into account by the courts while 
assessing trademark infringement, see GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK J. JANIS, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:  LAW AND POLICY 469–71 (2004).  In particular, 
although no list of factors is per se exclusive, factors listed by the Second Circuit in 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), are often 
cited as the most complete: 
[T]he prior owner’s chance of success is a function of many variables:  the 
strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the 
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the 
gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in 
adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the 
sophistication of the buyers. 
Id. at 495. 
 371. Accordingly, as long as all HARLEY-DAVIDSON T-shirts or YANKEES hats 
that are sold in the same premises and on the same shelf, i.e., as the same items to 
the public, are of identical quality, courts should allow the license at issue to stand 
regardless of whether the trademark owners exercised any control.  The same is 
applicable to all other scenarios in the Introduction:  as long as the quality of the 
same marked products is identical, i.e., consumers cannot be deceived, courts should 
not declare licenses invalid because of lack of quality control. 
 372. Product quality is not only affected by licensor and licensee control, but also 
by laws, regulations, and consumer demand.  For example, many restaurants, 
including franchising chains such as MCDONALD’s, have recently changed well-
known recipes in order to eliminate trans fats from their menus, in response to a 
demand for healthier products.  See Jeannine DeFoe, Food Makers Get on a Health Kick:  
PepsiCo, Kraft, and others are making strides in reducing trans fats and producing healthier 
foods to meet consumer demand, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.businesswe 
ek.com/print/investor/content/dec2006/pi20061214_187559.htm; see also 21 C.F.R. 
§ 101.45 (2007) (detailing strict labeling requirements for foods containing trans 
fats).  To return to the examples offered in the Introduction, GE phones and 
SAMSUNG TVs also change over time as technology progresses and new product 
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follow the new quality guidelines.373  However, if quality variation 
applies only to part of the marked products without a specific reason, 
such as changes in state laws or geographical differences,374 courts 
should presume the licenses invalid because the public could be 
deceived.375 
Finally, courts should look at the efforts that licensors and licensees 
have undertaken to notify the public of any variation in product 
quality.376  In particular, courts should not invalidate agreements 
when the packaging of the products or the premises where they are 
sold contain disclaimers or labels that exhaustively indicate the 
quality variation so that the average consumer will unlikely be 
mistaken about the actual quality of the products at issue.377  
Traditionally, courts have looked at disclaimers with diffidence, yet 
even if part of the public will not be aware of the commercial 
advertising the new quality of GE phones, or pay attention to the 
labels and signs on the seller’s premises indicating the changes in the 
quality of SAMSUNG televisions or RALPH LAUREN sunglasses, 
these actions can serve as evidence that licensors and licensees 
                                                          
lines reach the market.  Consumers demand new technology, and as new products 
are introduced into the market, quality changes.  For example, GE’s website offers an 
innovation timeline that lists three to four “innovations” per year, including the 
releases of new technology (phones and otherwise) into the market.  General 
Electric, Explore the Innovation Timeline, http://www.ge.com/innovation/timeline 
/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). 
 373. See supra note 371. 
 374. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 15, at 375 (considering the quality control 
requirement in the context of permissible variable uses of similar trademarks in 
diverse geographical areas). 
 375. See supra note 367; see also Calboli, Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 
838–39 (elaborating a similar test for a proposed rule of assignment “with or without 
goodwill”). 
 376. “Courts have uniformly held that an adequate explanation negates the 
possibility of deception and hence the loss of trademark rights.”  Hanak, supra note 
8, at 374.  Specifically, the author uses the case of Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 
303 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1962), as an example where the court “held that a change in 
the breed of chickens did not constitute grounds for cancellation of the trademark 
when ‘the type of chick appears to have been otherwise indicated by the trademark.’”  
Hanak, supra note 8, at 374 (citation omitted).  Hanak also discusses the decision in 
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), where 
“enforceable rights in a trademark formerly applied to cigars made exclusively in 
Cuba of Cuban tobacco were not forfeited when the mark was applied to cigars made 
in Florida of non-Cuban tobacco since the fact was stated on the cigar boxes.”  
Hanak, supra note 8, at 374. 
 377. See Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1106–08 (E.D. 
Pa. 1973); Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, supra note 3, at 707; see also 
Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 
1119–21 (2002) (discussing the use of disclaimers by trademark owners with respect 
to the use of trademarks by licensees). 
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adopted adequate means to inform, and did not intend to mislead, 
consumers.378 
Notices to the public will not help consumers when licensors or 
licensees intend to act in bad faith and still take advantage of 
consumer reliance on a certain mark.379  These instances, however, 
represent clear examples of consumer fraud and accordingly, as 
mentioned earlier, should be punished as such by using the tools that 
are already available to the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
As consumers, we will likely not care whether HARLEY-
DAVIDSON, the YANKEES, or WESTLAW control the manufacturers 
of their promotional products, as long as the quality of these 
products is the same or we are made aware of any changes.  Likewise, 
we will likely not care whether PIZZA HUT, GE, or SAMSUMG 
control their licensees as long as the products we buy are identical to 
those advertised and shown in the store before our purchases.  Yet 
should one of these marks ever be cancelled or declared abandoned 
because its owner has not sufficiently controlled its licensees, we 
would undoubtedly be confused if a third party with no connection to 
the original business started to use the mark. 
As this Article has illustrated, a trademark licensor’s failure to 
control its licensees does not necessarily trigger consumer deception.  
Instead, such deception is generally triggered by the (unfair) actions 
of licensors and licensees.  Although indirectly, courts have 
confirmed this view by increasingly upholding licensing with minimal 
or no control as long as consumers are not deceived.  Still, the official 
standard continues to hold trademark owners liable for the lack of 
quality control, thus leaving the door open to judicial inconsistency 
as to what represents valid licensing.  The suggested amendment in 
favor of licensing “with or without control” will resolve this 
inconsistency and finally reconcile the conditions for the validity of 
licensing with the market necessity of a flexible standard on this issue.  
Even if many will criticize it, this amendment will not have negative 
consequences on consumers, and the judiciary has many alternative 
ways to enforce and prevent deceptive and confusing licensing.  In 
                                                          
 378. See Hanak, supra note 8, at 374 (stating that clearly explaining any changes in 
the product to the public may preclude a finding of deception); see also Calboli, 
Assignment “With Goodwill,” supra note 13, at 837 (underlying the role of disclaimers 
in support of assignment “with or without goodwill”). 
 379. See Hanak, supra note 8, at 374–75 (describing a case in which a token change 
in labeling was not adequate to overcome a finding of deception). 
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addition, it is likely to improve competition in the marketplace, and 
accordingly should be welcomed by all parties. 
 
